Not who couldn't sin, but who He foresaw wouldn't sin. They could still sin if they wanted to, just like now. There's no difference.



If sooner or later one would sin, with certainty, then I'm not pushing this too far.



It's logically impossible to determine a future that's already been determined (or fixed). If God sees the future as determined (or fixed), then it must be so. But the fact that the FMA really does make the choice (we agree on this point), means the future has NOT been determined, which means that God must see the future as not determined, but open. This is what I've been asserting, that God sees an open future.



I've had this conversation many times. I understand exactly where you're coming from. It's difficult for me to explain the logical problem from what some have called the "blueprint" perspective, but I'm doing the best I can.

What usually happens is people confuse the concept of logical impossibility with causation. That is, the fact that God knows what will happen does not cause one to choose what He has foreseen. But this isn't the problem.

To put it another way, the problem is not epistemological but ontological. Iow, it's not about the knowledge (or vision) of the future, but the nature (essential essence, character) of the future.

If God sees the future as single-threaded, then His knowledge of the future is such that the future must be single-threaded. This means at any moment of time, it's only logically possible for a given FMA to be doing exactly one thing, which is the thing which God has foreseen. Therefore it's logically impossible for that being to be doing some other thing. This means the FMA cannot logically do more than one thing, which contradicts the incompatibilistic definition of free will, which is our tradition as Armianists.

Compatibilitistic free will defines free will in a way that is compatible with determinism, which means there is no logical contradiction between a deterministic view of the future and free will. The compatibilistic definition of free will is that a person is free to do what he chooses to do (i.e., the person is not forced to do something against his will). The incompatibilistic defition is broader, saying that it must actually be possible, at a given point in time, to effect different options. So if a person is at a cross road, it's not simply the case that he chooses Road A because that's what he wants to do, but he could choose Road A or choose Road B.

What you are suggesting (at least, what I'm hearing) is logically inconsistent, as it has a determined future (this is what God sees; not the possibility of an action, but the certainty of it) with the incompatibilistic idea of free will (the person really could choose between the two options, one God sees being chosen, and one God sees not being chosen.)

A simple way to see the logical inconsistency is simply to ask the question if it's logically possible to do something which God has seen with certainty will not happen.



I understood that you were asserting it was certain that some moral agent WOULD sin.



No, not could, but would. This is what you said. If not Lucifer, some other FMA would have sinned.



OK, if it's possible for one not to sin, then it's possible for two not to sin. Similarly, it's possible for 10 trillion not to sin (or however many FMA's there are in the universe).

Out of the many trillions, or quadrillions, of FMA's there are, only a few billion have sinned. Had Lucifer not been created, it's quite possible none would have, perhaps even likely none would have.



This seems like just an opinion, which, to me, doesn't seem logical. From a logical standpoint, you have beings who were created perfectly, to love God, and be loved by Him. Why would anyone choose to "try something apart from God"? They would have no motivation to do so.



Are you saying that apart from sin, it's not possible to fully know and appreciate God's full character and righteous ways?



Not at all. There are different words that can be used. I've tried three did ways of expressing the concept: "fixed", "determined" and "single-threaded." The concept is that the future consists of things which are certain to happen, the things which God has seen will happen, as opposed to being consisted of, say, a net, or web, of possible things that might happen, with God seeing all of the possibilities.



I'm saying that if the future is epistemologically fixed from God's perspective (i.e., God knows, or view, the future as fixed, meaning He knows, or views, exactly what will happen) then it is ontologically fixed. Why? Because God sees (or knows) things as they actually are.



He knew it would be if Christ succeeded. But He sent Christ at a risk, the "risk of failure and eternal loss."



He would have experienced it all from the moment He decided to start creating things, as in His mind, it would already have been certain.

We experience things as possibilities turn into realities. That can happen earlier or later. It happens when we know the possibility has become a reality. In the case of God, under the scenario you are suggesting, the reality would have been from the beginning.



Under the scenario you are suggesting, it would have been a "real" battle with a certain outcome. So it's "real" in the sense that Christ actually had to exert Himself, but not "real" in the sense that there could have been any other outcome than what happened. There would have been no risk of failure, since it's not possible for something God is certain to happen not to happen.



It was *God* who took a risk in sending His Son. It wasn't simply an apparent risk that Christ felt He was taking, because of His foreknowledge growing dim, but a very real risk that both took. This is how it's presenting in inspiration. COL 196 discusses it from Christ's standpoint, as well as DA 131, saying that Christ took a risk ("Christ risked all"). DA 49 puts it from God's perspective, God's permitting His Son to come at the risk of failure and eternal loss. COL 196 tells us that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. In order for this to be true, it cannot be the case that God was certain heaven was in no danger. Iow, there had to be a real risk involved. That is, it had to have been actually possible for Christ to have failed, in God's mind. If, in God's mind, there was no chance of Christ's failing, then there was no actual risk, only an apparent one.



It's not the reality of the battle that's being dismissed, but the possibility of a different outcome.

You believe God knows all the possible choices and all the possible outcomes. Doesn't that mean our choices and outcomes are limited to the ones God foresees? How is this significantly different than believing God knows precisely which choices and outcomes will play out?

Also, if knowing the future for God is like knowing history, do you think it robs FMAs of their ability and freedom to choose as they please? If knowing history doesn't rob them, why would knowing the future like history rob them?

PS - Please don't overlook my previous post to you.

Yes. God sees everything that can possibly happen. We cannot do something which is impossible.



Because more than one option is possible.



In this case, the freedom FMAs have would be an illusion. One could not logically do anything different than what God has foreseen would happen, meaning that one cannot choose to do among different options. So this would contradict the incompatabilistic definition of free will. However, one could still do what one chooses to do, which is the compatibilistic definition, and it wouldn't contradict that.




The history has already happened, so it really is single-threaded. Knowing what you did doesn't impact your free choice because at the time you did what you did you were able to choose among different options. If it is known what you will do before you do it, then at the time you are choosing to do whatever you choose to do, there are not multiple options available that can actually be chosen, since you can't choose to do something different from that which is certain to happen. Only if it's not certain to happen can you logically choose among different options (in the sense of being able to effect one or the other of them).



Ok.

People and things.



It is what it is because people and things have done certain things. At the time it was happening, different things could happen, but after the fact, it cannot be changed.



No, it's not. Even God can't change the past. He can change the future, however, which is exactly what He says in Jeremiah 18:





You're contradicting yourself. What you believe is certainly single-threaded. That's what a rerun is. It's not different from one time to the next, but always the same. Single-threaded.



MM, it's not the same. The past is different from the future. Again, this is not an epistemological issue, but an ontological one. The past is actually, in fact, different from the future. Therefore perfect knowledge of the past must be different than perfect knowledge of the future.



Which is why knowing the future is different than knowing the past, because the future is ontologically different than the past.



Apparently He foresaw Himself acting in different ways, since there was a struggle involved. If He only foresaw one possibility, there wouldn't have been any struggle. Having a meeting with Christ, where Christ had to go into conference with Him three times, certainly wouldn't make any sense if God simply foresaw this is what Christ was going to do, and what He would do. He would have just said, "I knew this was going to happen. Here's how we're going to handle it." That's exactly what would have happened were things as you are suggesting. But God didn't act that way. He acted the way one would expect Him to have acted if the future were open, which is He decided what He was going to do, knowing that He could choose among different options.



This is only under your view. Under my view, He foresaw the possibility of Christ's failure, which is why there was a risk involved, and a struggle for Him to make His decision.



This makes many things different. For example, it makes the future single-threaded. It makes risk impossible. It makes EW 126-127 not make any sense. Also statements like "Christ could have come 'ere this" become false.

(More later).

If you mean possibilities, how could He not know? He knows everything.



Because in all the possibilities God foresaw, this happens.



There's no logical problem in this scenario, because different things can happen. The logical problem occurs in your view because only one thing can happen.



As I said, there are many things in inspiration which depict risk. I stated a number of examples. The principle of risk is all that's needed. It's not necessary to list every possible example. The Bible doesn't work that way.

Could Christ have sinned? Was God aware of that fact? If it was really a possibility that Christ could have sinned, and God foresaw that, then the answer to your question follows from that. So cite the Bible texts you think prove that Christ could have sinned, and there's the answer to your request.



This implies sin was a part of God's plan. That can't be right.

I'm bowing out -- I knew my attempts wouldn't reach any connecting point of understanding. Actually Tom, I'm sorry but I find your perspective very strange and anything but logical.

God's foreknowledge of what people will do, is NOT the same as forcing them to do it. It just isn't and I can't understand why you think it is? It doesn't make any sense whatsoever to me. Sorry.

As far as reaching the predetermined conclusion (Christ will set up His kingdom and sin will be no more) God works AROUND peoples choices, doing His utmost to save all EVEN THOUGH HE KNOWS many will reject Him.

Go back to Jacob. Jacob was to receive the birthright. It wasn't God's plan that he obtain it by fraud. That was Jacob and Rebekkah's doing as free moral agents-- they most certainly DID NOT HAVE to that. Yes, God knew they would do it but that didn't in any way influence them into doing it, they could have waited for God to work things out but they chose not to, and God worked with Jacob to bring him to repentance and bring him back on track.


But, I'm sure you still don't understand what I'm trying to say, and we are not to waste time arguing when we know there is no point of agreement. Time is far too short -- we don't know how soon it will close and Christ will come.

But one thing I know for sure --
Christ will come
The promises of the restoration of all things is sure!

I wasn't going to write anymore,but this bit in the discussion rather troubled me.

First I don't know what MOB stands for.
But for now I'm going to assume it has something to do with the Sunday law and loss of freedom to worship which we as Adventists believe.

Now, if as Tom seems to be saying; this endtime scenerio was just one "in all the possibilities God foresaw this happens". How do we know this will be the "possibility" that actually plays out.

There have been other people I've talked to who hold a "possibilities" view, and they would do away with the whole Sunday law situation saying it was one "possibility" that could have happened and would have happened back in the late 1880's or early 1900's IF the church had accepted the 1888 message in fullness.
Back then Sunday legislation WAS being agitated, and Sabbath keepers in some Southern states were being persecuted. So that would have been the scenerio that would have played out back then if conditions had been met and Christ could have come.

But, they told me, since the church didn't meet the conditions, it never happened that way. Now, according to them, we are on a different "possibility" track that won't have Sunday laws.

MOB means "Mark of the Beast." I haven't heard of the ideas you are speaking of (regarding that the Sunday law scenario could have happened, but didn't, and now something else will happen). I think it's certainly true that things would play out differently now than they would have over a century ago, and, similarly, if time should last into the future for a similar time period, things will play out differently then than they would now. But the same general principles would apply in any case (i.e., regarding the Mark of the Beast, Sunday worship, Satan's impersonation of Christ, etc.) and that's because Satan is the great instigator of the whole thing, and his character will not have changed.

It's too bad, I think, that you're bowing out so soon. I don't think it's possible a subject like this could be understood in so briefly. I know in my case it took something like 20 years to get to the point to where I felt things were starting to fit together.

If you were interested, I could point you to some resources that approach the subject in more detail.

I was especially disappointed that the statements such as COL 196, DA 49, DA 131 and EW 125-126, which make clear that there was a risk involved (which is impossible if we accept the premises that God sees exactly one thing happening for every moment of time in the future, and that everything which God sees will happen) were not considered.

Perhaps you'll wish to consider the subject later in the future some time

What good does it do God to know countless options if He has no idea which one will play out? How can He make any future plans? He would have to live in the moment, right?


Stating what happens after the fact in no way limits their options before the fact.


Why do you think God's reality and our reality are identical so far as the future is concerned? Why do you think God's ability to know the future like history alters our reality?