You seem to be dismissing the fact my view says God knows the future like history, that is, He reports the facts after the fact. Since this is what I believe, why do you keep insisting my view means we are deluded if we think we are free to choose as we please? Do you think reading history means the people making choices in real time are deluded if they think they are free to choose as they please? I don't think you are grasping the significance of my view.

Tom, regarding post #127328, you seem to be saying the Bible says the Father and the Son both expressed doubt about it. Please post those passages. Thank you.

PS - I'm not talking about you using human logic to extrapolate a conclusion. Please post a passage that plainly has the Father or the Son saying, in so many words, "I'm not absolutely certain Jesus will succeed. There's a chance He will sin and fail." Don't bother trying to apply unrelated circumstances to prove you have the right to conclude something similar inherently applies to the Father and the Son not knowing with absolute certainty Jesus will succeed.

Here are some:



Note she says that "should Adam fall" that "provisions had been made." This is contingent language.

She givens an example of the working of the provision here:



So here we see her using contingent language in regards to the fall of man.

In regards to the fall of Lucifer, she explains that the existence of sin is a mystery. It can only be a mystery if it wasn't the case that God set into motion a course of events that was certain to result in sin. So there's contingency there as well.

So my point is that there are statements which appear both to be contingent and not in regards to the fall of man.

Other statements which speak to contingency are those which say that Christ "could have come 'ere now."

Of course, there is the statement that "all heaven was imperiled" and that "Christ risked all," which is clearly contingent.

I also made some arguments in regards to moral problems which the idea of a fixed future has.

Another statement which comes to mind is the one in COL about our hastening the coming of Christ. Of course, if the future were fixed, this would be impossible.

I've never said this. Please read more carefully.

You spoke of the future being "full of possibilities." I said this is a delusion. I've also said the incompatibilistic (libertarian) view is a delusion, if the future is such that you believe. However, here you say I "keep insisting" your view means we are deluded if we think we are free to choose as we please, when I've NEVER said that. So please, once again, read more carefully.



No, the problem is not that I'm not grasping the significance of your view, but that you're not reading carefully. We've discussed this for years. It's a bit disappointing that you're not paying attention to what I'm writing; I've explained this so many times.



I re-read the post, and didn't see anything even remotely suggesting this. If you didn't understand something I wrote, or wish me to provide some substantiation for something I wrote, please quote it.



Again, I don't know what you're referring to. If there is something I said you wish support to, please quote it.

I can repeat my belief. I believe the future is fundamentally different than the past. I believe the future is comprised of possibilities (as well as some things which are fixed). Where self-determining beings with free will (libertarian definition) are involved, the future is not single-threaded, but multi-threaded. I believe the Scripture presents the future in such a way, and have presented many, many Scriptures to substantiate this. One time you even expressed admiration of the list presented.

I hear you saying "should Adam fall" most likely means the Father and the Son were uncertain it would happen, and that the passages I posted, which leave no doubt the Father and the Son were absolutely certain Adam would fall, most likely mean they were uncertain it would happen.

No, MM, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that in regards to the fall, there are passage of two types; those which look to be contingent, and those which look to not be. In addition to these passages, of which there are both types, there are passages on other subjects, besides the fall, which are clearly not contingent. For example:

1.Christ could have come before now.
2.Christ risked all.
3.All heaven was imperiled for our redemption.

In addition, there are other passages dealing with the fall which make clear that it was contingent. For example:

5.God was in no way responsible for the entrance of sin.
6.Sin is a mystery which cannot be explained.

We'll add a 7th category, which has the too types:

7.Passages discussing the fall:
a.Passages which sound contingent.
b.Passages which don't sound contingent.

It looks to me that you are trying to lay hold of 7.b., while ignoring, or setting aside, 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7a.

I've also pointed out that there are moral problems involved with your view, which I don't think you've addressed. At least, if you have, I don't remember what you said. For example, if God set into motion a course of events in which sin was certain to occur, then He would be responsible for the entrance of sin. This is a moral problem. A good being wouldn't do something to make sin inevitable, with all the misery and suffering that results.

I asked, "Do you think reading history means the people making choices in real time are deluded if they think they are free to choose as they please", to which you responded, "No ..." Do you also agree, then, that if God knows the future like history, that from His perspective it is no different than reading a history book? Ellen wrote:


I realize you believe the insights stated above most likely means the Father and the Son are, regarding most things, uncertain how the future will play out, but for the life of me I don't know how she could have expressed my view more clearly.

Also, does the Bible represent the Father and/or the Son expressing doubt as to whether or not Jesus would succeed on the cross?

And, do you agree that if God supernaturally knows the future like history that it wouldn't make any difference so far as how things play out in real time for FMAs? Or, do you think it would necessarily limit or eliminate freedom of choice?

What is it about the language employed in the passages I posted that leads you to think they could be taken to mean the Father and the Son were uncertain Adam would fall or not? Or, do you agree with me the passages clearly say the Father and the Son were absolutely certain Adam would fall?

I don't think there is a moral problem with God deciding to create angels and humans even though He knew which ones would sin and die in the lake of fire. Why do you think you're view is free of moral problems? Your idea that God created angels and humans even though He knew there was a chance they might sin and rebel seems more morally problematic than my view.

Also, why can't I apply your logic regarding Nahum 1:9 to the Messianic prophecies? That is, why can't I believe God saw that none of the possible choices and outcomes involved Jesus sinning and failing?

If God knew the future like history, that would mean the future is like the past. This is what I'm disagreeing with. The past is fixed; the future is not.

Regarding the EGW quote, God sees the future as clearly as He sees the past, but this doesn't mean the future is like the past.



What? No, this doesn't make sense.



She could have said that the future is fixed. She could have defined free will as the ability for to do as we please. She could have avoided statements which are contingent. She could have avoided saying that God, or Christ, took risks. She could have avoided saying that sin is a mystery. She could have avoided saying that God was in no way responsible for the entrance of sin. She could have avoided saying that Satan is the author of sin and all its results. She could have avoided saying that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. There's all sorts of things she could have done.

Just reading EGW's writings as a whole, they don't strike me at all as being deterministic. Our heritage is an Arminian one, not a Calvinistic one. Just speaking in terms of the tone of her writings, compared to how you write, you have a much more deterministic view of things than she does.



I responded to this in detail in a previous post, and have repeatedly asked you to respond to that post, and not just keep asking this same question as if I had not already answered it. Please do as I'm asking.



I've explained this many times.

The problem is a *logical* one. It's not one of causation. It's not that God's knowledge causes something to happen; nobody would assert this. This is obviously not the case. It's obvious there's no connection between one's knowledge and making someone else do something. This is not a point that needs to be made.

The logical contradiction is that if the future is fixed, then one cannot have free will from the libertarian perspective. Again, as I've explained just recently, if one uses the compatibilistic definition, which you used, in saying that we are free to do as we please, then there is no logical contradiction. The future can be fixed, and God can see the future like history, and we can have free will. There's no problem here.

However, if we assert that we can actually impact the future, that our decisions matter, in terms of altering the course of the future, that "free will" involves being able to effect either of 2+ options, *then* there's a logical contradiction.

I'm not considering only those passages. That's not how one studies things. For example, in Ex. 4 it says:



Do we really think that God was seeking to kill Moses?

There are many examples of this in Scripture, where if we just took one bit of Scripture, it appears to say something which we realize it's not really saying when we compare Scripture with Scripture.

The same thing applies to the SOP. For example, to pick an example that will resonate with you, there are places in the SOP where it may appear to be saying that Christ had a sinless human nature, the nature of Adam before the fall. But if we consider all she wrote on the subject, we can understand these statements in a larger context.



That would contradict what she said elsewhere. You appear to be doing what I just said. You are laying hold of 7a, but ignoring 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7b. It's like the nature of Christ argument.



It's not knowing which ones that's the problem, but that there are any at all. That is, He could have created angels and humans (given your point of view), without *any* dying. The moral problem is that He didn't do that, but preferred to create things in such a way that sin and death were inevitable.



Because God created beings with free will, with the possibility of choosing sin, but didn't do anything to make this inevitable, or even likely.



Why? Love involves risk. It's not possible to create beings which can love without there being the possibility of rejection. That's the way love works.

Surely the possibility of sin is less morally objectionable than the certainty of it. To suggest the reverse is the case seems absurd to me.



From the SOP, we know that Christ "risked all." Also, "all heaven was imperiled." So this would contradict the idea that none of the possibilities which God (or Christ, because He was omniscient too) involved Christ's failing. If this were the case, there would be no risk.



Because then no risk would be involved, and heaven would not have been imperiled.