Old Tom: It's not possible for something to both be inevitable and yet maybe not happen. You agree with that, don't you?

MM: Yes, I agree. But that’s not my point.

Tom: That was my point! You maintain both things, yet you agree with me that they can't both be true. This is rather remarkable.

MM: We both believe God’s knowledge of the future is perfect. The difference between us is that I believe His divine hindsight is equally as perfect.

Tom: I agree that His hindsight is perfect as well. Where we disagree is you think the future is fixed or inevitable. I don't believe that.

MM: Thus, the two agree perfectly. They tell the same story, the same details. And none of it means men and angels did not have the freedom to choose to obey, to choose not to sin and rebel.

Tom: Certainly the fact that the past is fixed has no bearing on our freedom. However, if the future were fixed, we would have no freedom, just the perception of being free. To be free implies the ability to alter the future, to choose between options which may result in either this thing or that thing. If only one thing is possible, there is no choice.

MM: Knowing they could and would sin and rebel does not mean they were incapable of choosing, devoid of the power of choice.

Tom: You're like a broken record. I've never said that God's knowing something causes something else to occur. Actually this line of thought would be more in harmony with your way of thinking than mine. What I have been asserting is that if the future is fixed, or inevitable, then we are incapable of choosing; we only have the perception of choice.

MM: Do you agree men and angels were designed free, and that they exercised their freedom of choice to sin and rebel?

Tom: Why do you ask this?

Old MM:

How is God’s foreknowledge, or hindsight, different than, or unrelated to, the nature of the future?

MM: This is probably where we need to spend more time.

Tom: Ok. But you should know that foreknowledge and hindsight are two different things. Hindsight is "understanding the nature of an event after it has happened" while foresight is "seeing ahead; knowing in advance." Knowing the nature of an event after it has happened is different than knowing in advance.

Old Tom: We seem to have chosen several subjects which are difficult to communicate on.

MM: That’s the beauty of it. People have nothing to say when they agree on everything. Have you noticed how quickly a thread dies when everybody agrees? It’s sad, but true.

Tom: It's true that differences lead to conversation. I've learned a lot from out discussions, althugh I still don't really understand how you think. Your conception of God's character seems rather dark to me. I also feel frustrated by being able to communicate apparently simple ideas like the fact that if the future is fixed we cannot be free. However, you are by no means the only one who has trouble seeing this. Truth be told, how you see things is more common than how I do, although, interestingly enough, the viewpoint I have been expressing is the majority view among Christian philosophers (but the minority view of Christian theologians).

Old Tom:I agree that His hindsight is perfect as well… But you should know that foreknowledge and hindsight are two different things… Knowing the nature of an event after it has happened is different than knowing in advance.

MM: Herein lies the crux of our differences. I believe, from God’s perspective, which is different than it is for us, foreknowledge and hindsight are identical.

Tom: What God's perspective is is irrelevant to the quesiont I have been discussing, which is the nature of the future. I have made this point many times. Perception does not change reality. God can only perceive things as they are, hence hindsight could only be the same as foresight if the past were the same as the future. However these things are not the same. The past relates to things which have already happened. They have no potential. The future, OTOH, is potential.

MM: He knows the end from the beginning. You believe, and correct me if I’m wrong, that God does not know our choices in advance, that He can accurately identify all the different choices we might make, but that He doesn’t know exactly which one we will decide on.

Tom: What you're saying here is illogical. If the future is fixed, there is no such thing as "differenct choices" just as there is no such thing in the past. This is only what will be.

Old Tom: To be free implies the ability to alter the future, to choose between options which may result in either this thing or that thing.

MM: We cannot alter the future because we don’t know the future.

Tom: The future does not depend on being known, any more than the past or present does. Our ability to alter the future has absolutely nothing to do with our knowing it.

MM: Only God knows the future.

Tom: Which remains irrelevant to whether or not the future is fixed.

MM: We are free to choose this or that way, but God has known from eternity the choices we will make.

Tom: This is logically impossible. If God has known something from all eternity, there's no possible way the thing He knows can not happen. Do you see this? Surely you agree with this, don't you? This is very obvious. If you disagree, let me know, and I will develop this point further. But for now, I will assume you agree.

Ok, now given that if God has known something will occur from all eternity that the thing He knows must occur, then we are not free to choose anything different than what God knows will occur. Do you see this? If not, I will develop this point.

Ok, now let's consider a thing we are conserding which has two options, A and B.

1)God has known from all eternity that A will occur.
2)Therefore A must occur.
3)Therefore we must choose A.
4)We cannot choose B, because that would contradict 1).

MM, do you follow this argument? Do you see that is is valid? If you do not agree that the argument is valid, please point out the step (or steps) which is (are) invalid.

Now if we cannot choose B, then we are not free, because freedom necessitates that *actual* ability to choose A or B, not just the perception of such.

Do you understand the point I'm making, MM? If you disagree, please don't just say "I disagree. God knows the future, but we are still free to choose what we wish because His knowledge of the future doesn't force us to do such and such." I know you think this, but you have not seen the logical inconsistency of your position. I am attempting to make this clear.

If you understand the argument, but disagree with it, please respond along the lines of "I disagree with step such and such because of blah blah blah." That is, you should either point out why one of the steps is itself false, or why a given step does not imply what I assert it does.

MM: And we both agree it doesn’t rob us of our freedom and power of choice. So, what’s the problem?

Tom: The problem is you are holding to a logically impossible position, which is that the future is fixed yet we are free.

Old Tom: What I have been asserting is that if the future is fixed, or inevitable, then we are incapable of choosing; we only have the perception of choice.

MM: You keep referring to the power of choice, as if knowing what we will choose, before we choose it, somehow robs us of our ability or capability to choose.

Tom: No, I'm not addressing this at all. I'm addressing the point that if the future is fixed, then we cannot choose differently that what is fixed. This has nothing to with our knowledge, or God's knowledge, of anything.

MM: The future, from God’s perspective, is based on the choices we are going to make. Since God knows our choices in advance, the future, from God’s perspective, is fixed or inevitable.

Tom: If it is fixed from God's perspective, then it is fixed. Period. End of story. God's perception is always equivalent to reality. So if God perceives the future is fixed, then it is. Surely you agree with this, don't you?

MM: It’s not fixed from our perspective.

Tom: If you hold to the position that that future is fixed according to God's perspective, but not to ours, then, if you are logical, you must agree with my assertion that our freedom is only perceptual and not actual. God's perception necessarily corresponds to reality. Our does not necessarily correspond to reality. So if God's perception differs from ours, His must be correct and ours must be wrong. So the future really is fixed, and we only have the *perception* (and a wrong one at that) that we can do something to alter it.

MM: Why? Because we do not know the future, except for the things God has revealed to us in the Bible, or might reveal to us in a dream or vision.

Tom: This is an irrelevant point. Our knowledge of the future does not have anything to do with its reality.

Old Tom: Your conception of God's character seems rather dark to me.

MM:I’m sorry you feel that way. You’re the only person I know of personally who feels that way about the view I have embraced.

Tom:You may ask the opinion of others. Truth is not decided by numbers, but I'm sure, for whatever it's worth, that there are others who share my viewpoint. However, you may think my view of God's character is wimpy or not legal or controling enough.

MM: As I have taught it over the years it has been a source of great comfort to many sorrowful souls.

Tom: What is comforting about the view of God you hold? You see Him as bloodthirsty, vengeful and killing billions upon billions, One who will forcibly torture those who disagree with Him in molten lave (or something equivalent). You see Him as the author of sin and death (these are all direct quotes of yours, by the way, which I can produce if requested).

Old Tom: Truth be told, how you see things is more common than how I do…

MM: Then it shouldn’t be so terribly frustrating for you, right? I mean, if the view I favor is the more common one, then I'm not the only one, in your opinion, who just isn't getting it.

Tom: No, you're by no means not the only one who doesn't get it. I've always been a logical person, born that way, and was trained in mathematics, and am a computer programmer, where logic is paramount. Many people have difficulty with logic. That I get frustrated is a shortcoming on my part.

I will say that I really appreciate your continuing this dialogue. It has helped me develop clearer thoughts and arguments, which I appreciate.

Old MM:You believe, and correct me if I’m wrong, that God does not know our choices in advance, that He can accurately identify all the different choices we might make, but that He doesn’t know exactly which one we will decide on.

MM:Is this how you believe?

Tom:I wouldn't put it exactly like that, but that's close enough. Basically I believe the future is not fixed, so God does not see it as something fixed and simple but rather His view of the future is open and vast. He sees all the possibilities together, some being more probable than others. God is also at work within the universe, and He can foresee everything He does and the impact that has.

Old Tom: If God has known something from all eternity, there's no possible way the thing He knows can not happen… then we are not free to choose anything different than what God knows will occur. Do you see this?

MM: No. We are always free to choose. God designed us that way. The fact God knows in advance exactly how we will exercise our power of choice does not mean we are not free to choose. True, we will do exactly what God has known all along. But it is only because we are free to choose, not because we are devoid of the ability to choose. We both agree on this point, right?

Tom: No, I don't agree. From my perspective you're pretty much writing that white is black. You are asserting that God has known from all eternity that a given thing will happen, yet it is possible for that thing not to happen, which, it appears to me, is utter nonsense, like saying white is black.

Here's the problem. If God knows has always known something will happen from all eternity, then that thing must happen. You agree with this, correct? So let's pick a specific thing. God has known from all eternity that I will have pizza for lunch tomorrow. Ok, now is it possible for me to not have pizza for lunch tomorrow? The answer is no, because if I had something other than pizza for lunch tomorrow then God would have been wrong about something He knew from all eternity, which is impossible.

Here's the argument laid out more formally:
1)God has known from all eternity that I will have pizza tomorrow for lunch.
2)Therefore I will have pizza for lunch tomorrow.

It should be made clear that 1) does not cause 2) from a sense of force, but from a sense of logic. God is not forcing me to have pizza for lunch tomorrow, but it is a logical consequence of step 1) that I will have pizza for lunch tomorrow.

Now let's consider the contrapositive. Remember that if an argument is valid, the fact that A implies B means that ~A impies ~B (i.e., the converse of A implies the converse of B). So we assume I do not have pizza for lunch tomorrow we have:
~2) I do not have pizza for lunch tomorrow.
~1) God has not known for all eternity that I will have pizza tomorrow.

But we started out assuming that 1) was true, therefore ~2 is not possible. Hence it is not possible for me to have pizza tomorrow. Hence, I do not have the freedom of choosing not to eat pizza tomorrow. I only have the perception of being able to make a choice other than pizza, not the actual ability to choose other than pizza.

I hope this is clear!

Old Tom: The problem is you are holding to a logically impossible position, which is that the future is fixed yet we are free… I'm addressing the point that if the future is fixed, then we cannot choose differently that what is fixed.

Tom: I wouldn’t use the word “cannot”, instead I would say “will not”. In other words, since the future is fixed, like a rerun, we will not choose differently than what is fixed.

MM: What we're really talking about here is compatibilistic freedom vs. imcompatibilistism. You are expressing the deterministic viewpoint, which is the viewpoint that Calvinists hold. Adventists have traditionally been imcompatibilistic. All of the Adventists of the 19th century were imcompatibilistic. Since the 1950's some deterministic ideas have crept into SDAism.

If you're unfamiliar with the term "incompatibilism," the following website discusses it in detail: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/

Basically "incompatibilism" means the belief that God's determining the future is incompatible with freedom. The arguments I've been using are the classic imcompatibilistic arguments, which are discussed more formally in the website I referred to.

Old Tom: So the future really is fixed, and we only have the *perception* (and a wrong one at that) that we can do something to alter it.

MM: Since we do not know the future we cannot alter it.

Tom: This is groundless. Our knowledge of the future has absolutely nothing to do with our ability to alter it. Nothing.

MM: All we can do is what we choose to do. And God has known from eternity, like reading a history book, exactly what we will choose to do.

Tom: Then all of our future choices are fixed, just like all of our past one ours. Since our choices are fixed, our freedom is only perceptional. We do not really have more than one option for anything we do. It must be in accordance with what is already fixed.

MM: You and I both agree if God knows the future like He knows the past, like reading a history book, then everything I’m saying about the future and our freedom to choose is true.

Tom: What you're saying about the future would be true, but what you're saying about our freedom of choice would be false. White is white, not black. If the future is fixed, then our choices are determined before we act. Thus we cannot be the ones determining them.

MM: It’s just that I believe it and you do not. Or, did I misunderstand you?

Tom: I'm holding to a position which is not logically impossible.

MM: Since I believe God has already watched history play out, from the end of time looking backwards to the beginning of time, He knows everything that will happen, before it happens, like watching a rerun. Do you agree? If not, then this would account for our inability to agree on God's role during the great controversy, and His right and ability to control and manage the outcome.

Tom: I do not believe in determinism, which is what your position is. I'm an incompatibilist. I believe God has given us the ability to alter the freedom. We really can hasten or delay Christ's coming, for example.

Are you suggesting that God doesn’t know for sure if you will choose to eat pizza tomorrow? I would like to follow up this question with another one, but first I need to know the answer to this one.

quote:

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I'm addressing the point that if the future is fixed, then we cannot choose differently that what is fixed.

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I wouldn’t use the word “cannot”, instead I would say “will not”. In other words, since the future is fixed, like a rerun, we will not choose differently than what is fixed. It’s not that we are incapable of making a choice, like a robot, it’s just that we will not exercise our power and freedom to choose differently than the way God saw it unfold from eternity.

The fact is, we do not know what God knows, thus His knowledge does not affect the outcome of our choice. Whatever we end up choosing to do, though, will agree perfectly with divine hindsight. Divine hindsight, however, does not dictate which choices we make. Not at all. It merely reflects the choices we will make, like watching a rerun, or reading a history book.

quote:

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What you're saying about the future would be true, but what you're saying about our freedom of choice would be false.

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We both agree that if we possessed the power to see the beginning of time by looking at it from the end of time, like reading a history book, our knowledge of the future would not prevent people from exercising their power and freedom to choose. Or, did I misunderstand your position? I am saying divine hindsight has the same impact on the future that a history book has on the past.

MM: Are you suggesting that God doesn’t know for sure if you will choose to eat pizza tomorrow? I would like to follow up this question with another one, but first I need to know the answer to this one.

Tom: God knows for sure that I may or may not eat pizza tomorrow. I am free to do either. He created me with the ability to determine my own future. Until I determine it, it is not determined; therefore God cannot know it as such.

Your position is not logically possible. It is not possible for God to know something from all eternity and for that thing not to happen. Therefore the thing must happen, and I cannot choose something contrary to that.

Old Tom: I'm addressing the point that if the future is fixed, then we cannot choose differently that what is fixed.

MM: I wouldn’t use the word “cannot”, instead I would say “will not”. In other words, since the future is fixed, like a rerun, we will not choose differently than what is fixed. It’s not that we are incapable of making a choice, like a robot, it’s just that we will not exercise our power and freedom to choose differently than the way God saw it unfold from eternity.

Tom: As I pointed out, the lack of ability to do something different is not on the basis of force or power, but by logical necessity. It's not logically possible for us to do anything different than what the future holds, if the future is fixed. We only perceive that we can do something different.

If we will not do anything different that what we will do, then in what sence can we do something different?

MM: The fact is, we do not know what God knows, thus His knowledge does not affect the outcome of our choice. Whatever we end up choosing to do, though, will agree perfectly with divine hindsight.

Tom: But we're not really choosing, are we? This is the point. We only *think* we are choosing. Choosing means the ability to do this or that, to eat pizza or not eat pizza. But if God has known from all eternity that I will eat pizza, how can I possibly not eat it? What choice do I have?

By the way, you probably aren't aware of this, but your position followed to its logical conclusion leads to predestination and Calvinism.

MM: Divine hindsight, however, does not dictate which choices we make. Not at all. It merely reflects the choices we will make, like watching a rerun, or reading a history book.

Tom: God can only watch the future as if it were a rerun if the future is really like a rerun. It must be in its character like the past in order to be seen like the past. God cannot see the future in a different way than it actually is.

Now if the future really is like the past, then we are no more free to make changes that would alter it than we are to make changes that would alter the past. We have the perception of freedom, but not the reality. To really possess freedom, we must be able to alter the future.

Old Tom: What you're saying about the future would be true, but what you're saying about our freedom of choice would be false.

MM: We both agree that if we possessed the power to see the beginning of time by looking at it from the end of time, like reading a history book, our knowledge of the future would not prevent people from exercising their power and freedom to choose.

Tom: If we could see the future as if it were like the past, that would mean it was like the past, and the people we were viewing would not have the actual ability to make choices, but only the perceived ability. They couldn't actually do anything different than what we saw they would do.

MM: Or, did I misunderstand your position? I am saying divine hindsight has the same impact on the future that a history book has on the past.

Tom: If this were true, then the future would be like the past. We can only read a history book about the past because the nature of the past is such that only one thing actually happened. If only one thing can happen in the future, then we could see it, and read it like a history book.

However, if the future is not like the past, then no matter how much ability God gave us to look into it, we could not see it as if it were the past.

It's like you can't see that 2+2 is 5 because it's not 5. Even if we had perfect knowledge and vision, 2+2 still wouldn't be 5. If the future is not fixed, then perfect knowledge and vision won't fix it, nor make it appear to be fixed. Perfect knowledge and vision would reflect what it is really like, not simplify it into something which it is not.

I'm going to repost the argument I made from a previous post:

quote:

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Here's the argument laid out more formally:
1)God has known from all eternity that I will have pizza tomorrow for lunch.
2)Therefore I will have pizza for lunch tomorrow.

It should be made clear that 1) does not cause 2) from a sense of force, but from a sense of logic. God is not forcing me to have pizza for lunch tomorrow, but it is a logical consequence of step 1) that I will have pizza for lunch tomorrow.

Now let's consider the contrapositive. Remember that if an argument is valid, the fact that A implies B means that ~A impies ~B (i.e., the converse of A implies the converse of B). So we assume I do not have pizza for lunch tomorrow we have:
~2) I do not have pizza for lunch tomorrow.
~1) God has not known for all eternity that I will have pizza tomorrow.

But we started out assuming that 1) was true, therefore ~2 is not possible. Hence it is not possible for me to have pizza tomorrow. Hence, I do not have the freedom of choosing not to eat pizza tomorrow. I only have the perception of being able to make a choice other than pizza, not the actual ability to choose other than pizza.

I hope this is clear!

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Did you follow this argument? Especially the contrapostive part?

Do you see from this that it is not possible for me to have pizza tomorrow, given the assumption that God has known from all eternity that I would have pizza?

Now I wish to reemphasize that it is not merely that I will not have pizza tomorrow, but that it is impossible for me to have pizza tommorow; having pizza tomorrow is not something that it is in my power to do; I can't do it.

The reason I cannot is logical, not causual. It is not that God's foreknowledge of my eating pizza makes me not eat pizza. That's not the point. The point is that logically if I could eat pizza then the contrapositive would mean that God has not seen from all eternity that I would eat pizza. It's a logical impossibility, not a volitional or physical impossibility.