MM: I don't see how you have addressed the argument in any way. Please do so.

For your convenience, I'm reposting it:

quote:

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Here's the argument laid out more formally:
1)God has known from all eternity that I will have pizza tomorrow for lunch.
2)Therefore I will have pizza for lunch tomorrow.

It should be made clear that 1) does not cause 2) from a sense of force, but from a sense of logic. God is not forcing me to have pizza for lunch tomorrow, but it is a logical consequence of step 1) that I will have pizza for lunch tomorrow.

Now let's consider the contrapositive. Remember that if an argument is valid, the fact that A implies B means that ~A impies ~B (i.e., the converse of A implies the converse of B). So we assume I do not have pizza for lunch tomorrow we have:
~2) I do not have pizza for lunch tomorrow.
~1) God has not known for all eternity that I will have pizza tomorrow.

But we started out assuming that 1) was true, therefore ~2 is not possible. Hence it is not possible for me to have pizza tomorrow. Hence, I do not have the freedom of choosing not to eat pizza tomorrow. I only have the perception of being able to make a choice other than pizza, not the actual ability to choose other than pizza.

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If the argument is invalid (specifically the part in bold) then either one of my premises is false, or some construct of the argument is invalid. Since you disagree with the conclusion, of these things must hold for your disagreement to be reasonable (i.e. either a premise of mine is faulty, or some point I'm reasoning is valid, meaning that something I have concluded does not really follow from a premise).

So please point out explicitly what premised you disagree with, or what reasoning you do not think is valid and why.

Thank you.

(If you still wish me to, after responding to this, I will be happy to respond to your previous post)

Thank you for the Happy Sabbath wish.

Here's one explanation of how God can know the future. Everything that happens can be reduced to the movmements of particles (such as atoms, molecules, and so on). God knows all of the possible paths all the unnumbered particles can take, and can see these results perfectly, because He is infinitely intelligent. So God can see the future perfectly without any need of it being in nature like a T.V. rerun.

Regarding the argument, here it is again:

1) Assume God has known somthing, an event, which we will call E1, will occur at time T for all eternity.
2) It follows that at time T, E1 must occur.

Now assume that E1 doesn't occur. Then, by the fact that if A=>B then ~B=>~A, it would follow that God has not known that thing for all eternity. So ~E1 is not possible.

In terms of pizza, if God has known from all eternity that I will have pizza at some time T, then it is not possible that at that time T I will not have pizza. That is, it is not possible for me to choose to have pizza at time T, because I cannot have pizza at time T, because such an act would mean that God did not know from all eternity that I would eat pizza at time T.

In order for me to have free will, it must be possible for me at time T to either eat the pizza or not eat the pizza. However, I have shown that it is not possible for me to not eat the pizza. Therefore I do not have free will to eat the pizza or not eat the pizza at time T. I may think I do, but I really don't. It's not simply that I won't refrain from eating the pizza at time T, but I cannot. It's not a logical possibility. It's as impossibile for me not to eat that pizza at time T as it is for me to fly to the moon.

I hope that was clear.

By the way, you cannot accept the formulation of a valid argument of the type A=>B and not accept ~B=>~A following the normal formal laws of logic. For example, if it is raining, then it is cloudy is an argument of the form A=>B. The contrapositive would be, if it's not cloudy, then it must not be raining. If you accept the argument that if it's raining, it must be cloudy, then the argument if it's not cloudy, it must not be raining follows.

Similarly, if you accept the argument, if God has known something will happen for all eternity, then that thing will happen, the argument if the thing does not happen, then God did not know from all eternity that the thing would happen follows. If we say it is impossible for God know to know the thing would happen from all eternity, then it is equally impossible for the thing not to happen. If that thing is my eathing pizza, for example, then it is impossible for me not to eat pizza. If I cannot actually not eat the pizza, then I cannot choose not to eat the pizza, because I cannot refrain from eathing the pizza without choosing not to eat it. Therefore I cannot choose not to eat the pizza. Therefor I do not have free choice, as far as my not eathing the pizza is concerned.

Now this same argument can be repeated for any act of my life, so it follows that I do not have the free will to choose to do anything contrary to what God has known from all eternity I would do. Given that God known everything I will do, I do not have free will regarding anything I do. I am not really free, but merely have a false impression that I do.

Tom, you have made it clear that God does not know the future, that He only knows all the possibilities, that if He knew the future it would make us robots, devoid of freedom. However, are we any more or less free if our choices are limited to the possibilities God is aware of?

MM, I have NEVER said that God does not know the future, so please quit writing that!! If you read over what I've written, I have stated dozens of times that God knows the future perfectly. Why don't you write that. E.g.

"Tom, you have made it clear that you believe that God knows the future perfectly." Why would you write I have made something "clear" which I have expressly and repeatedly denied?

If we are free to do anything which is possible for us to do, but not free to do things which are impossible for us to do, then we are as free as it is possible for us to be. That makes sense, doesn't it?

That's a strange way to write a post. It took me a while to figure out what you were doing. At first I thought you were quoting me, and then I saw you were quoting yourself. Apparently the point of the post is the part in bold, to re-ask the question. I addressed that question in the last paragraph of my previous post.

MM: Yes. And the fact God knows in advance exactly which choices we will make does not, in any way, rob us of our freedom to choose.

Tom: So what? This isn't the issue under discussion, as I've pointed out many, many, many times. I have never asserted this point, but have pointed out many, many, many times that the problem is a logical problem, not an issue of God's foreknowledge causing anything. The logical problem has to do with the future's being fixed.

MM: But, if you maintain that God only knows which choices we are capable of making, how, then, is your view less limiting than mine?

Tom: Because you believe the future is fixed, which means we can only make one choice. I believe we can make more than one choice. That's how your view is more restrictive then mine; because "more than one" is greater than one.

MM: How can God enjoy not knowing what we will do?

Tom: Why would God enjoy a creation which was spontaneous and not robot-like? Because God likes freedom and spontaneaity.

MM: Are we capable of making choices that God has not foreseen?

Tom: God sees everything, so we'd have to be able to do something which does not exist a possibility, which would be difficult.