I can't think of succinct title heading, so I'll just leave it as "The Contradiction."

MM wrote:



to which I responded, "this isn't the problem." I thought I'd explain here why this isn't the problem, and what the problem is. It seemed to that since the title of the topic where this conversation took place is "How Can a Person Know if a Prophecy is Conditional or Unconditional?" that this might be a better spot to discuss this, since this question doesn't really address the question of the topic.

It's obvious that God's knowing whether or not something will happen does not influence whether or not the event will occur (unless, of course, He takes direct action to cause the event to come to pass). When the contradiction between compatible free will and determinism is brought out, often those who hold the deterministic view will respond the way MM did (as quoted above), but this is "itching where it doesn't scratch" as an ex-professor of mine would say. No one thinks or is saying that God's knowing something will happen interferes with free will.

Ok, so if this isn't the problem, what is? The problem is that how we define free will may conflict with reality, depending on our assumptions. Let's assume:

a)A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A).
b)Only event A can happen at the given point in time.

It should be obvious that this is a contradiction. This is where the problem lies. If only event A can occur, then event B cannot occur. The person in a) cannot do B. He could choose or want to do B, but he can't actually do it. If we define free will differently, this contradiction can be avoided.

Please notice that up until here, God's foreknowledge has not come into the picture. Before introducing God's foreknowledge, I'd like to see if we can all agree that a) and b) are indeed contradictory; that is, a person cannot do either of A or B if only A can occur.

I agree. Since "A" is the only possibility, then "B" is not a possibility.

From the other thread, we have this:



What this means is that if God knows that something will happen in a certain way, it will. So if God knows that A will happen, and not B, then we have:

c)If God knows A will happen and not B, then A will happen, and not B.

From the first thread, we know that the following is a contradiction:

a)A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A).
b)Only event A can happen at the given point in time.

This is a contradiction because if only A can happen, then the person in a) cannot do B.

From c) we have: If God knows A will happen and not B, then A will happen, and not B.

Thus it follows that if God knows A will happen and not B, then we have a contradiction with a). That is, the following to items are contradictory:

a)A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A).
c)If God knows A will happen and not B, then A will happen, and not B.

Either a) can be true but not both. Actually I'm saying this a bit imprecisely. It's really the following two things which are contradictory:

a1)A person can do either of A or B.
b1)God knows that A will happen and not B.

I'm responding here, which seems like a more appropriate place.

TE: Ok, let's stop here a moment. If something that God knows how it will play out cannot happen differently than what God knows will happen, then is there anything that can happen differently than what God has already seen? The answer must be no, right?

MM: Right.

Since God knows all things, and all things happen as God knows they will, it should be obvious that no one can do anything different than what God knows will happen. Thus no one has free will using the definition that a person can do either of more than one thing at a given time, since only the thing that God knows will happen can actually happen. One is constrained to define "free will" in some other way than the ability to do either of more than one option at a given time. One can only do an exact thing at any given time; the thing that God knows one will do.

TE: Please notice that up until here, God's foreknowledge has not come into the picture. Before introducing God's foreknowledge, I'd like to see if we can all agree that a) and b) are indeed contradictory; that is, a person cannot do either of A or B if only A can occur.

MM: Is this a good time to discuss God's foreknowledge?

I knew you would ask that.

What other definition of free will could there be?

Main Entry: 1free
Pronunciation: \ˈfrē\
Function: adjective
Inflected Form(s): fre·er; fre·est
Etymology: Middle English, from Old English frēo; akin to Old High German frī free, Welsh rhydd, Sanskrit priya own, dear
Date: before 12th century
1 a: having the legal and political rights of a citizen b: enjoying civil and political liberty <free citizens> c: enjoying political independence or freedom from outside domination d: enjoying personal freedom : not subject to the control or domination of another
2 a: not determined by anything beyond its own nature or being : choosing or capable of choosing for itself b: determined by the choice of the actor or performer <free actions> c: made, done, or given voluntarily or spontaneously
3 a: relieved from or lacking something and especially something unpleasant or burdensome <free from pain> <a speech free of political rhetoric> — often used in combination <error-free> b: not bound, confined, or detained by force
4 a: having no trade restrictions b: not subject to government regulation cof foreign exchange : not subject to restriction or official control
5 a: having no obligations (as to work) or commitments <I'll be free this evening> b: not taken up with commitments or obligations <a free evening>
6: having a scope not restricted by qualification <a free variable>
7 a: not obstructed, restricted, or impeded <free to leave> b: not being used or occupied <waved with his free hand> c: not hampered or restricted in its normal operation
8 a: not fastened <the free end of the rope> b: not confined to a particular position or place <in twelve-tone music, no note is wholly free for it must hold its place in the series — J. L. Stewart> c: capable of moving or turning in any direction <a free particle> d: performed without apparatus <free tumbling> e: done with artificial aids (as pitons) used only for protection against falling and not for support <a free climb>
9 a: not parsimonious <free spending> b: outspoken c: availing oneself of something without stint d: frank, open e: overly familiar or forward in action or attitude f: licentious
10: not costing or charging anything
11 a (1): not united with, attached to, combined with, or mixed with something else : separate <free ores> <a free surface of a bodily part> (2): freestanding <a free column> b: chemically uncombined <free oxygen> <free acids> c: not permanently attached but able to move about <a free electron in a metal> d: capable of being used alone as a meaningful linguistic form <the word hats is a free form> — compare bound 7
12 a: not literal or exact <free translation> b: not restricted by or conforming to conventional forms <free skating>
13: favorable — used of a wind blowing from a direction more than six points from dead ahead
14: not allowing slavery
15: open to all comers

Thomas, the definitions for free will are in theology often split into two types, one called "compatibilistic" and the other "incompatibilistic." "Compatible" has to do with being compatible with determinism.

What the Calvinists argue, and they are correct, is that it is logically inconsistent to have a deterministic view of things and the definition of free will which I've suggested, which is the ability to perform different actions at a given time. They are much more consistent logically than Armenianists on this point (which is to say, they are logically consistent, whereas traditional Armenianists are not).

The Calvinist definition of free will is that one has free will if one is able to do that which one desires to do. Their definition is dependent not upon the ability to actually do different things, but to be able to do that which one wishes to do. This definition of free will is compatible with the notion of a future which only has one option available.

TE: I knew you would ask that.

MM: I am afraid to do anything without your permission. You can be pretty sensitive about it.

Why? I'm just trying to explain things in a step by step way that can be understood.