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Here is a link to show exactly where the Space Station is over earth right now: Click Here
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: Tom]
#85416
02/14/07 01:56 AM
02/14/07 01:56 AM
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SDA
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MM: Are you suggesting Sister White said if Jesus had failed He would have remained in the tomb for eternity? TE: Yes. MM: Interesting? Please share the quote. Thank you. I couldn't find it. It said something like if Jesus had sinned, the stone would never have been removed from the tomb. I'm quite sure it's not in the Desire of Ages (which isn't very helpful, I know).………………………… MM: What is the context of “A”? Does it represent what will happen in the future? If so, then what does “B” have to do with it? TE: The context is as explained from the very first post of this topic. Just re-read the first post. Quote: a) A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A). b) Only event A can happen at the given point in time. MM: Again, what is the context? Why is it that only “A” can happen? How did we come by such knowledge? For the purpose of my question, it doesn't matter. Why only A can happen isn't important. *That* only A can is all that's necessary to respond to my point. Now whether or not some pre-condition implies that A must happen can be discussed at a future time, but why A must happen in no way affects the logic that *if* A must happen, then certain conclusions follow. …………………………. TE: How is my saying that you say that only A can occur misrepresenting your view? It's just what you said! MM: That’s not what I believe. Again, just because “A” happens, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. As I've stated twice, I didn't say anything about B in regards to your view. Only A.Just because God reports that “A” happened, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. That is, it does not mean we lacked the ability or freedom to choose differently. TE: This is an interesting theory, which we can discuss later, but to be clear, I didn't say you said B was an impossibility. I said you said A was a certainty, which you did say. I did not mispresent your view. MM: Here is what you said: Quote: If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A. The "as MM is insisting" applies to "If only A can happen,"MM: I never said we “do not have the ability to do anything other than A.” I said that! You said that only A can happen.The fact we will not do “B” has nothing to do with it being an impossibility. The fact that B cannot happen has to do with it being an impossibility.In other words, we possess the ability and freedom to do “B”, but we will not do it. If B cannot happen, we cannot do it.Instead, we will do “A”. Do we know in advance what we will do? Unless God reveals it to us, we have no idea what we will and will not do before we do it. Only God knows the future like history, like a rerun. ………………………….. TE: If there is no such thing as B, then only A can happen, right? How is this misrepresenting your view? MM: Again, I’m talking about what has happened, not what might happen. “A” is what happened. “B” is what could have happened, but didn’t. Thus, when talking about what did happen, “B” does not enter the discussion. When discussing things before they happen, we cannot divorce God from the discussion. Only God knows what happened before it happens. TE: I didn't say you said anything about B. Please re-read what I said again. MM: Again, here is what you said: Quote: If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A. MM: Since you said I said “we cannot do B” it seemed necessary to make it clear I do not believe it. No, I didn't say that. I said that you said only A can happen. I can see how you could misread what I wrote, but the "as MM is insisting" is only in reference to "If only A can happen"........................ TE: At some point you might wish to deal with the original question of this topic, which has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge. It simply states that if only A can happen (your words!) and not B, then our definition of free will should address this fact. A person cannot do B (assuming A and B are mutually exclusive) if A must happen. How could this not be true? MM: It is true that I was willing to go along with your original equation by agreeing with it, which, against my wishes, divorced God from the picture. And then, without fair warning, you accused me of insisting on something I don’t believe. No, you just misunderstood what I wrote.Again, it is imperative to understand how and why we know in advance that “A” will happen and not “B”. What is the basis of our knowledge of the future? Answering these questions will help us understand the truth about the future and the role free will plays. This doesn't change the logic in any way. We can deal with that after we've dealt with the logic. If you think the logic does change, then postulate the scenarios in which the logic changes and explain why it changes.The definition of free will, as I understand it, is that we possess the ability and freedom to do as we please. This is the compatibilistic definition of free will, which the Calvinsits use. This definition is logically consistent with the concept of God's foreknowledge that you hold. So you are holding to a logically consistent system of thought. (this sure took a long time to get to!).
What I suggested was a different definition for free will (referred to as "incompatibilisitic" or "libertarian" free will, which is what Armenianists use, of which SDA's are by tradition). The libertarian definition of free will is not that we have the ability to do as we please, but that we are able to choose and actually different things, which may or may not please us. For example:Free will is affected by human nature but retains ability to choose contrary to our nature and desires. (from a web site) A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A). In reality, though, we are conceived and born in sin. Thus, we are naturally, instinctively the slaves and servants of sin, self, and Satan. Separated from Jesus, we “can do nothing but evil.” (3SM 196) Consequently, our options are really only one – choose Jesus. This is consistent with the Calvinistic viewpoint, and consistent with the compatibilistic definition which you gave above.(snip) TE: I couldn't find it. It said something like if Jesus had sinned, the stone would never have been removed from the tomb. I'm quite sure it's not in the Desire of Ages (which isn't very helpful, I know). MM: It doesn’t make sense to me. I will reserve judgment, though, until you post the quote. TE: For the purpose of my question, it doesn't matter. Why only A can happen isn't important. *That* only A can is all that's necessary to respond to my point. Now whether or not some pre-condition implies that A must happen can be discussed at a future time, but why A must happen in no way affects the logic that *if* A must happen, then certain conclusions follow. MM: Then I’ve already answered the question. Please see the second post on this thread. TE: No, I didn't say that. I said that you said only A can happen. I can see how you could misread what I wrote, but the "as MM is insisting" is only in reference to "If only A can happen". MM: Thank you for clarifying. TE: The fact that B cannot happen has to do with it being an impossibility. If B cannot happen, we cannot do it. MM: But why we cannot do it is key to this discussion. So, again, why can’t it be done? TE: This doesn't change the logic in any way. We can deal with that after we've dealt with the logic. If you think the logic does change, then postulate the scenarios in which the logic changes and explain why it changes. MM: If we cannot do “B” because it is physically impossible, then it is logical. For example, if “B” represents a human flying to the moon and back in the buff, flapping his arms like a bird, then it stands to reason “B” cannot be done. TE: This is the compatibilistic definition of free will, which the Calvinsits use. This definition is logically consistent with the concept of God's foreknowledge that you hold. So you are holding to a logically consistent system of thought. MM: Okay. TE: This definition requires that there actually be more than one event which can happen; your definition does not. In your defintion, only A needs to be possible, given that A is what the person wishes to do. MM: Again, I believe we are born in slavery to sin, self, and Satan. We are not free to sin until we are free from sin. Sinning is our legacy and, unless we are born again and choose to abide in Jesus, sinning is our destiny. A) Before we experience the miracle of rebirth and choose to abide in Jesus we “can do nothing but evil.” (3SM 196) B) After we experience the miracle of rebirth and choose to abide in Jesus we are free to sin or not to sin. C) Whether we sin or not depends on whether or not we continue to abide in Jesus. D) God knows if we will abide in Jesus or not.
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: Mountain Man]
#85417
02/14/07 02:21 AM
02/14/07 02:21 AM
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JB: You cannot know that he knows it like that; but you can know that he does not know it like that, as I have plainly shown.
MM: I disagree. Unconditional prophecy is evidence God knows the future like a rerun. Otherwise, He would be able to foretell it.
JB: Esau and Cyrus have never been the holders of such knowledge. He who has such knowledge (as you profess) is God. The holder of such knowledge can never perform the judiciary activity that such knowledge tells him he has done; his knowledge incapacitates him to ever accomplish the judiciary activity.
MM: Both men knew of the prophecies concerning themselves. Such knowledge did not prevent from fulfilling their respective prophecies.
JB: No, God does not hope “things” will turn out right. “Things” do not have anything to do with right. His hope is not for “things”. But his hope is for those he created in his own image, that they may have faith and render righteous judgment.
MM: Nice twist. But I still disagree. God does not doubt or wonder or question if we will be like Jesus – He already knows if we will or not.
……………………….
MM: For whom is God an agent?
TV: For Himself.
MM: Interesting! I wonder how the trinity doctrine factors into this idea?.
TV: Our self judgement? Then we are all dead.
MM: “Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” (John 3:5)
TV: It is fate since it has no FMA author/actor involved. (Including God as a FMA). That the characters written about can only do what He penned is one of the fundamentals of your argumentation thus far.
MM: Not “can do”, but “has done”. FMAs will do exactly what God watched them do. From God's perspective the future is like watching a rerun.
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: John Boskovic]
#85421
02/14/07 03:31 AM
02/14/07 03:31 AM
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OP
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A person detests even the smell of garlic. In the arminian view, this person can choose to eat the garlic despite finding it utterly revolting. What about the calvinistic view? Yes, in the compatibilistic view, one could also eat the garlic. "Please" doesn't mean something that's pleasing; it means something you want to do. In this view, you are free to do what you want to do. So even though you only have one choice available, it's still free will, because that choice is what you want to do. They argue that what you do is your greatest will, or overriding desire. So even though you find garlic revolting, you may decide to to eat it anyway (e.g. you think it will help your health). You desire to improve your health overrides your desire not to eat it. They believe there is always an explanation for anything you do; there's always something determining your choice. Any choice can be explained, if you knew enough information and could determine the ultimate or greatest will. Jonathon Edwads "Freedom of the Will" goes into great detail regarding this theory. You can find it on line. The libertarian notion is that you can do one of two or more mutually exclusive events. In the compatibilistic notion you can only do what God knows you will do. The distinction I made between Armenian and Calvinistic was a bit inaccurate. Compatibilistic and libertarian is more accurate, where compatibilistic free will is a view of free will which is compatible with determinism. That is, it's a definition of free will which is consistant with (or compatible with) the idea that our future choices have been determined. To say it in simple terms, there's only one possible option, A, which one can do. However, this doesn't violate the notion of free will (as defined in the compatibilistic view) because A is what you wanted to do. You were free to do what you wanted. So the idea of free will (doing what you want to do) is compatible with the idea that you did what you wanted to do (A). That A was the only thing you could do does not diminish your free will in any way under this definition. Now the incompatilisitic definition of free will is that one can do either A or B (not actually want to do one or other, but actually do one or the other). This view is not compatible with the idea that only A can occur. Actually, even this isn't completely accurate. 1a) Open absolute free will
This refers to the idea that until a particular choice is made, that choice is completely “open,” meaning there is a real possibility for it to go either way. This implies that man’s choices are inherently “unknowable.” Not even God can know beforehand with absolute certainty what man will choose to do (although His knowledge of human nature gives Him the ability to make extremely accurate guesses). The reason for this is that if God infallibly knew in advance that some person would choose A instead of B, then that person’s choice would be inevitable and therefore not really “open.”
1b) Non-open absolute free will
This refers to the idea that God can foreknow exactly what choices man will make, and thus man’s choices are admittedly inevitable rather than “open,” yet man’s choices are still absolutely free in the sense that God can only foreknow them and influence them, but not ultimately determine them.
2) Compatibilistic free will
This refers to the idea that man’s choices are ultimately within the bounds of God’s sovereign control, yet they are free in the sense that God does not coerce man to choose against his will, but rather sovereignly determines what man wills in the first place. In other words, if some person chooses A instead of B, it was ultimately God’s decision that he would make that choice, and yet the choice was still free because the person made it willingly, not being coerced against his will. God made Him willing to make that choice.
What I've been calling incompatibilistic free will is 1a above. Compatilistic free will is actually stronger than the idea that we only have one choice availabe, which 1b also asserts. Really we've been arguing 1a) vs. 1b) on this thread. What I've been saying is that the definition of free will as being able to do A or B logically contradicts the idea that only A is possible. You and John and I have been arguing from the 1a) perspective. The others have been arguing 1b). The argument the 1b) people have been making is that God's foreknowing the future does not mean Hs is forcing us do what He foreknew. The 1a) people don't care. Calvinists would care, and would argue that the 1b) people are wrong, but 1a) people agree with 1b) people on this point, but would say that it doesn't make any difference, because they've never claimed otherwise. This is where the 1b) people scratch where it doesn't itch. Every conversation I've ever had with a 1b) person falls into this pattern. The 1a) people argue that the future is open and not fixed and the 1b) people respond that just because God knows what we will do doesn't mean He is forcing us to do it.
Those who wait for the Bridegroom's coming are to say to the people, "Behold your God." The last rays of merciful light, the last message of mercy to be given to the world, is a revelation of His character of love.
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: Tom]
#85422
02/14/07 04:51 AM
02/14/07 04:51 AM
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OP
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TE: I couldn't find it. It said something like if Jesus had sinned, the stone would never have been removed from the tomb. I'm quite sure it's not in the Desire of Ages (which isn't very helpful, I know).
MM: It doesn’t make sense to me. I will reserve judgment, though, until you post the quote.
If Rosangela reads this, maybe she can find it. She's good at that.
TE: For the purpose of my question, it doesn't matter. Why only A can happen isn't important. *That* only A can is all that's necessary to respond to my point. Now whether or not some pre-condition implies that A must happen can be discussed at a future time, but why A must happen in no way affects the logic that *if* A must happen, then certain conclusions follow.
MM: Then I’ve already answered the question. Please see the second post on this thread.
That says, "I agree. Since "A" is the only possibility, then "B" is not a possibility." This doesn't say anything about the fact that since B is not a possibility, a definition of free will which says that one can do A or B is logically consistent, which is the whole point of the topic. (thanks for addressing this, btw)
TE: No, I didn't say that. I said that you said only A can happen. I can see how you could misread what I wrote, but the "as MM is insisting" is only in reference to "If only A can happen".
MM: Thank you for clarifying.
Sorry about the misunderstanding.
TE: The fact that B cannot happen has to do with it being an impossibility. If B cannot happen, we cannot do it.
MM: But why we cannot do it is key to this discussion. So, again, why can’t it be done?
I haven't gotten to why. Before discussing why, I wanted to establish agreement on what seems to me to be extremely obvious. If A must happen, then B cannot. Therefore a definition of free will which depends upon both A and B being doable is logically inconsistent. I don't see why it's taken so long for people to agree to this.
TE: This doesn't change the logic in any way. We can deal with that after we've dealt with the logic. If you think the logic does change, then postulate the scenarios in which the logic changes and explain why it changes.
MM: If we cannot do “B” because it is physically impossible, then it is logical. For example, if “B” represents a human flying to the moon and back in the buff, flapping his arms like a bird, then it stands to reason “B” cannot be done.
They why we cannot do B does not change the logic. What matters is if the assertion that we cannot do B is true or not, but we haven't gotten to that point yet. All we're discussing now is if, given the assertion that A must happen, if the following two things follow:
a)B cannot happen (you've agreed to this)
b)A definition of free will which states that both A and B must be doable is logically inconsistent.
You have sort of addressed this by suggesting a definition of free will which is logically consistent with your viewpoint that only A is possible.
TE: This is the compatibilistic definition of free will, which the Calvinsits use. This definition is logically consistent with the concept of God's foreknowledge that you hold. So you are holding to a logically consistent system of thought.
MM: Okay.
TE: This definition requires that there actually be more than one event which can happen; your definition does not. In your defintion, only A needs to be possible, given that A is what the person wishes to do.
MM: Again, I believe we are born in slavery to sin, self, and Satan. We are not free to sin until we are free from sin. Sinning is our legacy and, unless we are born again and choose to abide in Jesus, sinning is our destiny.
A) Before we experience the miracle of rebirth and choose to abide in Jesus we “can do nothing but evil.” (3SM 196)
B) After we experience the miracle of rebirth and choose to abide in Jesus we are free to sin or not to sin.
C) Whether we sin or not depends on whether or not we continue to abide in Jesus.
D) God knows if we will abide in Jesus or not.
The definition that you suggested, that one has free will if one has the ability and freedom to do what one chooses, is consistent with all the above. The definition of free will that I used in the beginning of this topic, that free will means one can do either of A or B, is logically consistent with none of this way of thinking, especially D).
I was wishing to make two points in this topic. This is one of them. I'll make the second if we get agreement on this point. (this point being that if it is true that A must occur, then B cannot occur, and a logically consistent defintion of free will, will reflect this).
I really wasn't wishing to debate whether or not your viewpoint (or mine) is correct or not. We've debated that before, and can debate that on another topic (or this one too, if that's what people want to talk about), but I don't want to lose sight of the purpose for which I started this topic.
Those who wait for the Bridegroom's coming are to say to the people, "Behold your God." The last rays of merciful light, the last message of mercy to be given to the world, is a revelation of His character of love.
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: Tom]
#85423
02/14/07 05:11 AM
02/14/07 05:11 AM
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OP
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I wanted to comment on the horse race analogy. The problem with it is, to borrow a legal phrase, it is assuming things not in evidence. That is, it is assuming that the future is such that one can jump forward in it and see one given alternative (i.e., a fixed rather than open future). But if the future is not like that, one cannot do that. Let's assume the future is open, and there are six horses, any of which could win with equal probability. Assume one jumps into the future six times. The first time one sees the first horse wins, the second time the second, and so forth. Under this scenario, one could go forward into the future, see the first horse win, report to the better that the first horse was seen to win, the better bets on it, and the second horse wins! The fact that one has seen a given event happen does not mean that it must happen. But while were on the topic, going back a ways: In this sense we say that only horse A can win, and not horses B, C, D or E. Of course you had five possibilities (any of the horses could win the race) - but once you saw the result, the other possibilities are discarded. Unless, of course, you intervene and, for instance, break the leg of horse A ... If you went into the future and saw that A won, how could you break A's leg? If A's leg were broken, then A wouldn't have won, and you wouldn't have seen him win; you would have seen A's leg broken and some other horse winning. (This is besides the point, but it was bugging me.) This scenario sounds like someone's been watching too man "Back To The Future" movies!
Those who wait for the Bridegroom's coming are to say to the people, "Behold your God." The last rays of merciful light, the last message of mercy to be given to the world, is a revelation of His character of love.
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: Tom]
#85424
02/14/07 05:11 AM
02/14/07 05:11 AM
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Bro Tom, I want to find out a bit about your background, so I know how to proceed. I'm only about half way through the posts, so I don't know if this has already been addressed. Are you at all familiar with the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics? In particular, I'm thinking of the double-slit experiment for electrons. How about Feynman's sum-over-paths concept? How about the physics theories that propose multiple universes?Thanks.
Last edited by asygo; 02/14/07 09:32 PM.
By God's grace,
Arnold
There is no excuse for any one in taking the position that there is no more truth to be revealed, and that all our expositions of Scripture are without an error. The fact that certain doctrines have been held as truth for many years by our people, is not a proof that our ideas are infallible. Age will not make error into truth, and truth can afford to be fair. No true doctrine will lose anything by close investigation. RH 12/20/1892
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: asygo]
#85429
02/14/07 04:00 PM
02/14/07 04:00 PM
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SDA
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TE: Therefore a definition of free will which depends upon both A and B being doable is logically inconsistent.
MM: Inconsistent? You mean because “B” is logically impossible?
TE: You have sort of addressed this by suggesting a definition of free will which is logically consistent with your viewpoint that only A is possible.
MM: Please don’t misunderstand me. It’s not my viewpoint. I’m only going along with it until we can discuss pertinent details. If “B” is impossible I do not count it as an option, so far as free will is concerned. If both “A” and “B” are equally doable, then we have the ability and freedom to choose either one.
TE: The definition that you suggested, that one has free will if one has the ability and freedom to do what one chooses, is consistent with all the above.
MM: I agree.
TE: The definition of free will that I used in the beginning of this topic, that free will means one can do either of A or B, is logically consistent with none of this way of thinking, especially D).
MM: I disagree. Hopefully we can discuss this in more detail. Let me know when you’re ready.
TE: If you went into the future and saw that A won, how could you break A's leg? If A's leg were broken, then A wouldn't have won, and you wouldn't have seen him win; you would have seen A's leg broken and some other horse winning.
MM: Only humans can botch things up as bad as you have described. God doesn’t make mistakes. He gets it right the first time. Thus, there is no need to change things. In other words, God doesn’t watch the rerun, realize He made a mistake, and then resolve to go back and fix it.
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: Mountain Man]
#85430
02/14/07 04:13 PM
02/14/07 04:13 PM
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OP
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Arnold, many years ago I was briefly a Physics major (before I wised up!). I studied post-graduate Mathematics. I have a strong statistical background, having worked in the actuarial field, as well as studying Math. Right now I'd say I have a better than average lay person's understanding of Physics, but not much beyond that.
I'm quite familiar with the statistical nature of quantum mechanics (and have thought about how that fits into the things we are discussing here). I used to know about the double-slit experiment, but it's been too many years to remember any details. I'm familiar with Feynman in a general sense, having read some of what he's written. Before I went to the link you gave, I would have said I was not familiar with the sum-over-paths idea, but I am somewhat familiar with it, I just didn't know that's what it was called. (I also didn't know it was Feynman's idea).
Those who wait for the Bridegroom's coming are to say to the people, "Behold your God." The last rays of merciful light, the last message of mercy to be given to the world, is a revelation of His character of love.
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: Tom]
#85440
02/14/07 07:29 PM
02/14/07 07:29 PM
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SDA
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Bro Tom, Good to know that. I want to explore what you're saying in the context of physics. That might give me a better handle on what exactly you're saying and its ramifications. For a refresher on the double-slit, the wiki is pretty good. I believe Feynman's idea is also called sum over histories. Maybe that's more familiar. Anyway, I'm no physicist myself, but I dabble in it now and then. I only have time for a general question right now. I'll save the more detailed stuff for next time. In classical mechanics (deterministic), it was theoretically possible to accurately predict a future event if one knew the exact values of every particle's momentum and position. But the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle makes modern mechanics probabilistic, making it impossible for us, even theoretically, to accurately predict a future event. Is God limited by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle? If not, does He then see a deterministic universe, where complete knowledge of the present allows an accurate view of the future?
By God's grace,
Arnold
There is no excuse for any one in taking the position that there is no more truth to be revealed, and that all our expositions of Scripture are without an error. The fact that certain doctrines have been held as truth for many years by our people, is not a proof that our ideas are infallible. Age will not make error into truth, and truth can afford to be fair. No true doctrine will lose anything by close investigation. RH 12/20/1892
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Re: The Contradiction
[Re: asygo]
#85442
02/14/07 07:45 PM
02/14/07 07:45 PM
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OP
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That's a good question, Arnold. I wouldn't say that God is limited by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, but that God chose to create things in this way. That is, God chose to create things so that they are spontaneous and non-fixed. Even inanimate objects are like this. I think this was more "very good" than a Universe where everything would be fixed. That is, God created things in such a way that even He can experience joy and spontaneity in the things that happen.
My understanding of the physics is that the quantum principle is not due to a lack of knowledge. That is, it is not the case that if we simply knew more about the way things work that we could predict what would happen, instead of describing it probabilistically. That is, even if you asked God Himself what would happen to a certain particle, He would say, "Well there's an x% chance it will do A, a y% chance it will do B" and so forth. The laws of probability describe the way the particles move because that's the way God created things. He could have created them deterministically had He wanted to (assuming that would have worked, of course).
Those who wait for the Bridegroom's coming are to say to the people, "Behold your God." The last rays of merciful light, the last message of mercy to be given to the world, is a revelation of His character of love.
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Here is the link to this week's Sabbath School Lesson Study and Discussion Material: Click Here
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