I'm not sure which post you're responding to, but choosing to do A or B isn't the same as doing A or B. You can choose to do A, change your mind, and do B. But this is a minor point.

Given that it's possible that you can do either A or B, then wouldn't God have seen a future with you doing choice A and a future with you doing choice B? That is, doesn't He know what both possibilities would look like?

Anyway, let's walk before running. Do we agree that if you can only do A, then you can't do B? If so, then our definition of free will should agree with this. Do you agree? (Please note that the questions in this paragraph have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with God's foreknowledge.)

If I'm not mistaken, you've agreed to this in the past. So let's assume it's agreed that if you cannot do B, then you cannot do B, and a definition of free will should agree with the fact that you cannot do B.

The question that comes up is, does the fact that God knows you will do A mean that you will do A? That is, is it possible for God to know that you will do A (say an hour before A will occur) and for you to actually do B? Isn't the answer to this question obviously "no"?

Now you will probably want to point out the irrelevant fact that just because God knows you will do A doesn't force you to do B, which is true, but not relevant. The relevant fact is that you cannot/will not do B. The fact that there isn't a direct casual relationship between what God knows and what you do isn't important to this point. What is important is that you cannot/will not do B. Because you cannot/will not do B, it follows that our definition of free will should reflect this.

That is, simply put, we should have a definition of free will (if we wish to be logically consistent) that incorporates the idea that if B is certain to occur, then we can do nothing to bring B about.

The definition of freewill is the freedom of choice to do either A or B.

God's knowing in advance what choice a person will make before that person has even made that choice doesn't affect the above definition of freewill.

No I did not miss the point, but you've certainly missed mine.



You said this same thing a different way in a previous post of yours:So I ask you, if our choices does not affect what the future is like, and it's really the future that affects our choices and our free will, if the future really is (as you say) fixed and predetermined, then answer this:You've already stated that our choices do not affect the future, but that the future affects our choices. So since our choices have no affect on the future, what or who does/has affected the future?

And if it is truly as you describe (and I do not agree), then the very fact that there is only one future where our "choices" are fixed and determined, then we have choice at all!!! Freedom of choice then is a myth ... something that doesn't (and never) really exist.

Furthermore, if each of our sins are predetermined (i.e. fixed) as you are telling us, Tom, then we are not responsible for our sin and cannot be held responsible. For how could we have done anything but to commit those sins since they are in our future, fixed and determined by something or someone other than ourselves, because we did not sin because of our own choices, but because those sins are in our future, fixed and determined before the thought ever entered our mind, yes, even before we were born.

From your commentary, Tom, you seem to be saying that we are not fixing our future, and neither is God. So, who or what fixed and determined our future such that our choices are limited/affected?





The flaw in your argument here is in saying that I can't eat the okra. I can eat the okra, and I have before. But my personal taste is that I do not enjoy okra and rather dislike it, and because of that personal preference (not because of some cosmic dictator), my choice is to eat the macaroni and cheese instead of the okra.

So yes, free will is very accurately defined as my being able to eat either the mac-and-cheese or the okra. Both definitions work, both the one you proposed (free to do that which I please) and the one you rejected (being able to each mac-and-cheese or okra), for both definitions are saying the very same thing.

And, yes, a cosmic dictator: for you say that we don't have the choice but that our so-called "choices" have been predetermined by what the future is like, though you have not yet said who or what you believe to be responsible for the fixing of the future.

So, Tom, if not our choices (i.e. our free will), who or what has determined/fixed our future?

Den Borg, I'm not sure you're pointing the finger at the right person. Tom does not believe the future is fixed or predetermined. He is arguing against it. Nobody on this thread believes it. But Tom has been laboring to prove the view I have embraced teaches it.

In the case of the Christ's foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot's choice in betraying Christ, how open is open?

Remember that even way back in the Old Testament in Psalm 41:9 it was prophesied that Christ would be betrayed by one of His own disciples.


What are your thoughts on this?

True, making the decision is a different thing than actually carrying out that decision, so what's your point? Even in your A-B example above, the person did ultimately chose to do B. It was not a case of deciding to do A but doing B contrary to the choice; for you said the person changed their mind, IOW, he made a choice to do B and then did B.



Please explain to us that if "you can only do A", why then must the definition of free will have anything to do with this?!!

If you have no choice in the matter and MUST do A, then there is no free-will aspect to the matter whatsoever. It is not a matter of choice, because you MUST do A.

So, why must the definition of "free will" agree with anything that is unrelated and irrelevant to itself? Must the definition of "dog" include what a "cat" is? No, of course not! So why do you assert that the definition of free will must agree with something that has absolutely nothing to do with free will or freedom of choice?!



With all due respect, this is like saying: "The towel is wet, therefore that means the towel is wet. Therefore, since the towel is wet, it is wet and not dry. This means the towel is wet and the definition of "greasy" must agree with this."

Why do you say, "if you cannot do B, then you cannot do B"? Has anyone suggested that if you cannot do B then you could somehow do B when you cannot?!

And again, I ask you, if you can only do A and cannot do B, then why do you want this to affect the definition of "free will" or "freedom of choice"? I ask this because if you MUST do A and CANNOT do B, then free will has nothing to do with this, and therefore also has nothing to do with the definition of "free will".



Here above, you again assert that God's foreknowledge dictates what our actions will be, though you cannot see that this is exactly what you are saying.



The error in your logic here is in saying that you cannot do B. Again, if you truly "cannot" do B, then choice has not entered into the scenario, and since it is not a matter of choice, you did not "choose" to do A because you were not given the choice.

If you truly have the freedom to choose between A and B, then the fact that the future is known such that it is known you will do A and not B, does not mean that you cannot do B, it only means that you chose not to do B.

Again, the future facts does not affect your free will (as you have previously claimed), but rather the future facts are affected by the choices we make in exercising our free will.

In other words, the cause-effect relationship between our choices and what the future looks like in terms of what has or will happen, is that our choices are the cause, and the future is the effect. For some reason, Tom, you've turned this all around backwards.

Consider this: In the future, a towel is wet because it is in a tub of water, put there by you.

You, Tom, are telling us that you did not chose to put the towel into the tub of water, but that you were caused to have put the towel into the water because that is what the future looked like.

We are telling you that the future is what it is because you chose to put the towel into the tub of water, not that (as you claim) you did it because of what the future looks like.

You are telling us that the future caused your choices because the future is what the future is. That is wrong, but for the sake of argument, please tell us, what caused the future to be what it is? If not our choices, then what made the future look as it does?



Why must something that has absolutely nothing to do with "free will" be used to define "free will". That is like saying, "Because a tree is not a dog, then the definition of dog must reflect this."



If B is certain to occur, you must ask yourself "why" is it certain to occur. If B occurrs, then there is a cause that makes that happen. What is that cause? Unless you can determine that that cause is not "us", then you cannot claim (as you have done above) that we can do nothing to bring B about.

Thanks for the clarification, MM. I wasn't pointing fingers, but simply responding to the points and arguments made by Tom, which certainly seemed to be his own thoughts and arguments.

Tom: Is this true, that you've been arguing for a position that you yourself do not believe? If so, why didn't you simply tell me that you were playing the devil's advocate instead of carrying on as if you were tring to convince us that free will doesn't exist?

I perceived someone (Tom) in need of better understanding, and tried to help in that regard, but now I am told that Tom doesn't even believe what he was arguing for? If this is true, then I feel I've wasted my time, in that the need I perceived was not a need at all. I believe that these types of discussions are important so that people have a correct understanding of the nature of God and the nature of mankind and what love and free will are. But it seems that everyone here already understands all this, and I could have instead worked on preparing a Bible study, or a sermon, or something that would have truly met someone's need.

Perhaps the following disclaimer should have been included in the opening post of this thread to prevent this kind of misunderstanding:

A little tounge-in-cheek there. Well, everyone ... have fun with this little debate.

And although the future has me pegged as doing A) participating further in this fun little discussion, I am actually going to excercise my free will and instead choose to do B) prepare a sermon, clean the bird cages, and some other things.

I may decide to rejoin this thread again later as time affords. If not, then you'll likely see me on other threads. We'll see what the future holds.

I hope you all have a great and God-filled weekend.

God bless!

Good though-provoking question, Daryl. I would say that even in this case, as in all other cases, open is just as open as it is all other times.

In other words, just because God not only foreknew (but not caused) but also wrote down the prophecy as it would unfold in the future, it was still up to Judas to decide what he would and would not do.

Just as God's foreknowledge did not cause Judas to do what he did, neither did God's writing it down cause Judas to do as he did. If Judas had not betrayed Christ, then any prophetical texts about Judas would have read differently.