The future obviously isn't already history to those of us who live in the present with the past to look at in the historical sense and the future to look at in the biblical and prophetical sense, however, even though God communicates to us within time, He, who knows and sees the future as if it had already happened, isn't confined within time. This is why He knew that Judas would choose to betray Him and Peter would choose to deny Him even with Peter reacting to such a repulsive thought even to the point of saying that he would never choose to do such a repulsive thing as to deny his Lord.

What is meant by being confined by time? The thought that God is not confined by time, does that mean God travels through time into the future so that He learns what will happen by actually experiencing/witnessing those events as they happen? Then He travels back to now and can then prophecy the future because He has literally been there? If this is the case, is there a such thing as "now", since God could travel to any part of time, what would differentiate the past from the present and from the future?

Or does He simply know the future? Since He knows all, and He knows us intimately and infitely better than we or anyone else knows us, He also knows what we'll decide to do next, and what choices will come to us as a result. He also knows what those future choices will be and what new choices will result. He knows our decisions concerning those choices and what new choices they bring. And so on, ad infinitum.

You might want to read what has been posted so far in the What is the Truth About The Foreknowledge of God? topic.

Do you agree with the following paragraph?

My first point has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge. It is that if we can only do A and not B, then our definition of free will, to be logically consistent, should reflect this. You cannot logically define free will as the ability to do either A or B if only A can happen.



I've pointed out many, many times now that the difficulty is not that God knows exactly what will happen, but the existence of an "exactly what will happen." That is, you are postulating a future in which only one thing can happen, which is what God knows will happen. Clearly if God knows A will happen, and not B, then there exists only one future, which is the future where A happens and not B.

The fact that we do not know we will do A, and ignorantly think it's possible for us to do B is an artifact of our ignorance, and in no way reflects the reality of the situation.

Here's the thing. We have one perspective of the future, and God has another. In our perspective, we can do A or B. In God's, it is certain that we will do A. Who's is correct? That is, whose perspective of reality counts here, ours or God's?

Surely reality is what God perceives it to be, wouldn't you agree?

Den, it appears we've been misunderstanding each other. Sorry about that.

What I've been trying to show is that the position that MM and Daryl have been arguing for is logically unsound. In order to do this I accept their premise, and then argue that this leads to an absurd situation, which seems to be the same tack you are taking. So that's why it appeared to you that I was agreeing with the position I was actually arguing against.

There's three main points of view possible (there's actually a lot more variations than this, but I'll list the three main ones).

1)The Calvinistic view is that God not only foreknows the future, but foreordains it. No one who participates in this forum (with the possible exception of Mark, who hasn't been taking part in this discussion) has been arguing this position.

2)The traditional Armenian view that God foreknows the future, as being exhaustively determined, yet His knowledge does not interfere with our ability to do either of two or more mutually exclusive things. (I've been speaking of "A" and "B" throughout this thread).

3)The open view idea of the future, which is that the future is not comprised of something certain, which God can peer into and read like a T.V. rerun, but is comprised of possibilities, until these possibilities are actuated by self-determining free will agents.

I've been trying to show that option 2) is logically inconsistent. My reasoning has been the following:

First premise. The following argument is true:

a)Given that if A must happen, then B cannot happen, a person does not have the ability to do B.
b)A definition of free will, given a), should reflect that a person cannot do B in order to be logically consistent.

The two main definitions of free will are the following:

i)The ability to do either A or B.
ii)The ability to do what one wishes to do (in this case, A).

Calvinists argue that definition i) is not logically consistent with the idea that God has exhaustive deterministic knowledge of the future. And they are correct. It isn't logically consistent. So they propose ii). They have a system which is logically consistent, but wrong (we all believe, because we believe a person can do either of A or b).

Traditional Armenianism has a system which logically inconsistent, because if God knows that A will happen, then it is not possible for B to happen, and we're back to the a), b) argument above.

The open view idea (which is a branch of Armenianism) is that God knows the future as a collection of possibilities, not as only one thing.

I don't have a link for this, but here an exchanged I saved:

Now you are coming closer to the real issues of this debate.

Den, for your benefit, I propose you read the 5-6 first pages or more of this thread: http://www.maritime-sda-online.org/forums/ubbthreads.php?ubb=showflat&Number=84991&page=1&fpart=1
Everything that has been written in this thread is based on what happened in that thread.

No, although that point is true, you have already conceded that point, though there have been an occasion or two where you made comments that contradict that point.

Rather my points are:

• The future does not affect our choices, as you so argue. Rather the future is affected by the choices we make. IOW, our choices are the cause and the future is the effect/results; not the other way around as you describe it.
• The fact that we choose A when given the choice between A and B, and this is how the future unfolds, that does not mean that we were incapable of choosing B.
• That to say that we are only able to do what is determined for us by the future, which is what you are claiming, then we have no freedom of choice at all. Neither would we be responsible for committing sin, for when we sin, we are only doing so because that was in our future, and not because we personally made that choice. In other words, according to you, when we find ourselves sinning, it is not because we chose to sin, but because we had to sin, because it was apparently in the one-and-only future. My point here is that this is incorrect, we did not have to sin.

I'm not sure I know what your point is. Earlier someone stated that you really don't hold to the belief that you've been pushing in this thread. I'm still awaiting confirmation from you personally that you either believe what you've been talking about on this thread, or whether you are playing the devil's advocate because you think MM and perhaps others believe as you describe in this thread.

Yes, I think we have been talking past each other. I'll give this thread some time to reestablish equilibrium, and do some further background research into this thread by reading the recommended reading given me in a couple other posts. I may participate further in this thread later on.

Talk to ya'll later. Till then, may you all grow in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, ever growing closer to Him as the day of His appearing draws nearer and nearer.

God Bless.