I might be very dense because I don't see the distinction. I'm leaning toward All of the above.

When the alarm clock goes off, I can either leave it on or turn it off - two mutually exlusive events. And I'm free to do whichever one I want to do. It looks like both A and B happen to me everyday.

If you are forced to do that which is against your will, then that is not free will. That is enslaved will.

The poop swimmer, if he truly has free will, has chosen to jump in because the alternatives were worse (e.g. decapitation, castration, eye-gouging, dismemberment, ...). If I was looking at those options, I would willingly and gladly hop in the poop. You want backstroke? Breaststroke? I'd even learn to do the butterfly on the spot, if that's what I needed to do.

That's free will. It includes the option of changing one's choice under varying circumstances.

Maybe this is where the problem is. You've transposed the cause and the effect.

Here's how I see it: If you are not going to the beach (for whatever reason), then God knows with 100% certainty that you will not go to the beach. And the fact that God knows those reasons long before you do is irrelevant to your ability to choose between the two mutually exclusive actions.

The cause and effect is only logical. Here's the order of things:

a.The future is single-threaded (only one possible future, which can be seen like a T.V. rerun).
b.Rosangela will go to the beach, because that's what the single-threaded future shows.

The fact that God knows what this will be is irrelevant. What's important is that it is knowable. That is, there exists a future , which can be seen like a T.V. rerun, wherein Rosangela goes to the beach. Therefore, it is certain that Rosangela will go to the beach. Therefore Rosangela will go to the beach.

Whatever reasons Rosangela has for going or not going don't matter, and neither does the fact that God knows what she will do. The logical difficult arises when one makes the assumption that the nature of the future is such that it can be known like a T.V. rerun (i.e., seen in a single-threaded way).

The problem is an ontological one, having to do with the future, not an epistemological one dealing with God's knowledge.

If one accepts the compatibilistic definition of free will, that one is free to do what one chooses to do, this avoids the logical contradiction that arises with the single-threaded view of the future. If one accepts the libertarian definition, however (i.e. it's possible for Rosangela to either go to the beach or not), then there is a logical problem. She cannot logically do something which she certainly will not do.

Just a quickie.

knowable future != single=threaded

That seems to be the crux. Do you agree?

When I said "knowable," I meant knowable in a single-threaded way, like a T.V. rerun. I don't believe that's possible (because that's not reality). However, I certainly believe the future is knowable. (as it really is, like a web vs. single-threaded)

TE: ... ("hindsight" is a really weird choice of words for describing a knowledge of the future) ...

MM: God knows the end fom the beginning.

TE: It's not that God *knows* what we will do which causes the problem ...

MM: I agree. It's not a problem.

TE: ... (take God's foreknowledge of out the picture, and the problem identically remains), ...

MM: I disagree. We wouldn't be having this discussion were it not for God's ability to know the future like a rerun.

TE: ... but the fact that there is only one possible future which can happen.

MM: The future is in the hands of God. That's why He can prophesy what people will do in the future.

TE: I've explained this many, many times to you MM, and have never gotten any indication that you have understood what I'm saying.

MM: I understand what you're saying, but I do not have a problem with God knowing what we will do before we do it. I trust God.

Your response makes me wonder if you really have understood what I'm saying, since there's nothing in what I've said which would negatively impact trusting in God. So if you wouldn't mind, could you put in your own words what you understand my position to be?

Thank you.

TE: ... ("hindsight" is a really weird choice of words for describing a knowledge of the future) ...

MM: God knows the end from the beginning.

That's not what "hindsight" means.

TE: It's not that God *knows* what we will do which causes the problem ...

MM: I agree. It's not a problem.

There is a logical problem involved in your view, if you hold to the incompatibilistic idea of free will, which is that one can do either of more than one mutually exclusive events. If one uses the definition which you suggested, being able to do what you choose to do, then there isn't a logical problem.

The logical problem which exists is not epistemological, but ontological. That is, the logical problem does not arise because of God's foreknowledge, but because of the nature of the future (its being single-threaded).

TE: ... (take God's foreknowledge of out the picture, and the problem identically remains), ...

MM: I disagree. We wouldn't be having this discussion were it not for God's ability to know the future like a rerun.

Again, the problem is ontological, not epistemological.

TE: ... but the fact that there is only one possible future which can happen.

MM: The future is in the hands of God. That's why He can prophesy what people will do in the future.

If the future were *only* in the hands of God, then it would be single-threaded (or, at least, it could be). However, God has shared the ability to be self-determining with His creatures (at least the sentient ones), so that the future is not only in God's hands. The existence of sin is testimony of this.

TE: So if you wouldn't mind, could you put in your own words what you understand my position to be?

MM: You believe God knows all of the possible outcomes, but that He doesn't know precisely which one will play out.