Quote:
MS:You may say, yes but God loves everyone. That's true. But God did not set His love on all the heathen nations as He did on Israel.

TE:Only because they weren't willing. Israel, as bad as it was, was still the people the most potentially receptive to God's love and leading. God is not a respecter of persons. He dispenses truth as quickly as we are able and willing to receive it, whether as individuals or groups.

If the convenant and oath of God with Abraham was simply a matter of God's foreknowledge, that is, God made it because He knew they would respond the most favorably, then it has no depth of meaning.

I agree. God’s choice of Israel was not based on His foreknowledge.

The main lesson of the covenant is that God first loved His people and that love liberated them from physical and spiritual bondage the same as it does for us today and His love is also His claim to our heart's devotion.

I agree. God would have worked with other peoples as well, had they been willing. In fact, God often tried to do this.

Quote:
7:8 But because the LORD loved you, and because he would keep the oath which he had sworn unto your fathers, hath the LORD brought you out with a mighty hand, and redeemed you out of the house of bondmen, from the hand of Pharaoh king of Egypt.
7:9 Know therefore that the LORD thy God, he [is] God, the faithful God, which keepeth covenant and mercy with them that love him and keep his commandments to a thousand generations;
7:10 And repayeth them that hate him to their face, to destroy them: Deut.


So, in the above text we have the correct balance. God first loves and enters into a covenant with His chosen people.

God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to a knowledge of the truth. Whosoever will may come. God’s love is drying all unto Himself.



This puts it well. God draws all unto Himself. Only those who resist His drawing refuse to come to Christ.


The covenant is intended to last forever, to a thousand generations. We as individuals and as a church can still turn our backs on it but if we do, it only magnifies the grace of God in setting his love on those whom He foreknew would finally reject it.

This last part doesn’t seem to be the picture we get from Scripture. Instead we see God expressing disappointment, surprise, dismay, regret, and other emotions when He is rejected. A person, or group of persons, is free to either reject or accept. God sees both possibilities. If a person is self-determining, then there is nothing for God to foreknow but possibilities until the self-determining person makes a determination, at which point the possibility becomes a reality. The future is fundamentally different than the past or present.

God draws all to himself, that's true. But does he enter into a covenant with everyone? No. The covenant is made with the elect saints. Ellen White says the church is the special object of God's love. God loves everyone but the church is special because she is the elect bride of Christ. And if you have any doubts that God is especially in love with the bride, read the Song of Solomon which is especially about the courtship of Christ or Solomon and the church, the Shulamite shepherdess.

God draws all to himself, that's true. But does he enter into a covenant with everyone? No. The covenant is made with the elect saints.

He enters into a covenant to whoever does not resist His drawing. These are the elect. God is not a respector of persons. Whosoever will may come.

Ellen White says the church is the special object of God's love.

Of course. These are they who have responded to God's invitation, exteneded to all. Those who respond are afforded special care and love. Anyone can take part.

God loves everyone but the church is special because she is the elect bride of Christ. And if you have any doubts that God is especially in love with the bride, read the Song of Solomon which is especially about the courtship of Christ or Solomon and the church, the Shulamite shepherdess.

No doubts about God's loving the church. Just doubts that God unilaterally chooses some over others. I see that God chooses all who do not reject His drawing.

Mark, how are you relating these insights to the topic of this thread?

I thought I would bump this again.

I don't what post this is you're citing, DenBorg, but I'll make a few comments. First of all, God's knowledge of the future is a bit of a red herring in this question. What is mutually exclusive is free will + future is fixed. It's really the nature of the future that's the problem. Is the future fixed, or is it comprised of possibilities?

Regarding your shirt getting wet. Is it possible that you not spill water on your shirt at the specified point in the future when God saw this taking place? That God saw it really doesn't matter. The salient point is that *anybody* could see it, whether God, or any other creature. If someone can see what will happen in the future, and what is seen will of a certainty take place, then, clearly, something different than what is seen will certainly *not* take place, and there goes free will, assuming a libertarian, or incompatibilistic, definition of free will, which gets to how free will is defined.

There are two main ways, theologically, that free will can be defined. One is that you are free to choose to do one of more than one mutually exclusive events (e.g., you can spill water on your shirt or not). The other is that you are free to do that which you choose to do.

Actually spilling water on your shirt isn't a good choice for an event, since that is likely something which happens accidentally, so does not involve free will, since you did not will for the water to fall on your shirt. So let's change this slightly to taking a drink of water, something you would choose consciously to do.

Ok, under the definition of free will that you are free to do that which you choose to do (compatibilistic), it doesn't matter if God (or anyone else) sees what you will do, since you are simply doing what you want to do regardless of whether it's seen or not.

However, under the incompatibilistic, or libertarian, definition, for you to have free will it must be possible for you to either choose to drink the water or not. If it can be seen that you definitely will drink the water (by God, or anyone else), then there is no possibility that you won't, so under the incompatibilistic definition you cannot be said to have free will.

So whether there is a contradiction involved viz a viz the future and free will depends upon your view of the future (fixed vs. open) and free will (compatibilistic definition, or incompatibilistic).

Tom:
First of all, God's knowledge of the future is a bit of a red herring in this question. What is mutually exclusive is free will + future is fixed. It's really the nature of the future that's the problem. Is the future fixed, or is it comprised of possibilities?

Denberg:No, I disagree. God's foreknowledge is not a red herring. For you are trying to tell us by your arguments that God's perfect foreknowledge would mean that the future is "fixed". So God's foreknowledge is not a red herring at all.

No, God's knowledge of the future has nothing to do with it's being fixed. If you think that's what's being argued, you haven't understood the argument.

Tom:Regarding your shirt getting wet. Is it possible that you not spill water on your shirt at the specified point in the future when God saw this taking place? That God saw it really doesn't matter.

DenBorg:That is correct: It is possible that I not spill, and it is possible that I do spill ... it is based entirely upon my actions and choices, not upon whether God knows the outcome beforehand.

It has never been suggested that God's knowing the outcome of an event causes it to happen. I'm getting the impression that you think this is what is being argued, but it's not.

Tom:
The salient point is that *anybody* could see it, whether God, or any other creature.

DenBorg:What?! Are you trying to tell us that we all omniscient and can see the future?! If so then I must wholeheartedly disagree.

I'm pretty amazed by this response. My point was that it doesn't matter who sees the future. The salient point is that the future is seeable. Pointing out that this is the salient point in no way suggests that anyone is omniscient. I have no idea why you would jump to this conclusion.

Tom:
If someone can see what will happen in the future, and what is seen will of a certainty take place, then, clearly, something different than what is seen will certainly *not* take place,

DenBorg:That is true ... if the future is perfectly seen (which it is by God, for His Holy and true Word tells us He is omniscient, and declares the end from the beginning), then what is seen to happen in the future will happen in the future ...

... but not because of what you are about to say next (that free will is out the window and that what happens is because of the foreknowledge instead of because of the choices made), but rather it will happen because of free will and the choices made.

The point is if the future is seeable (who sees it doesn't matter, just that it is something which can be seen) then it is fixed. If it is fixed, then only one thing can happen in the future. This is not addressing in any way, shape, or form the *cause* of the action.

You keep stressing, over and over, that God's seeing the future does not cause it to happen, but this has never been suggested. I've never addressed causality.

Tom:
and there goes free will,

DenBorg:No, free will does not go out the window.

It does assuming one is using the libertarian definition.

DenBorg:What is foreseen of the future will happen because of the choices made (i.e. free will), not because the foreknowledge somehow fixes the future.

It's irrelevant *why* the future will happen the way it will. *That* the future will happen the way it will is the salient point.


Tom:
assuming a libertarian, or incompatibilistic, definition of free will, which gets to how free will is defined.

There are two main ways, theologically, that free will can be defined. One is that you are free to choose to do one of more than one mutually exclusive events (e.g., you can spill water on your shirt or not). The other is that you are free to do that which you choose to do.

DenBorg:I'm sorry, but this is total absurdity! This is not two different definitions of free will.

I don't know why you assert something like this. This is just basic theology. Here's an introduction: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodicy

DenBorg: This is only a difference in the type of choices presented to the person!

It has nothing to do with types of choices. I just explained what the two main definitions for free will are, in theology.

DenBorg: Some choices are mutually exclusive .. it is impossible to do both. For example, you can either take a drink, or you can not take a drink. But you cannot both drink and not drink. That is a choice between two mutually exclusive activities. It is a physical and logical impossibility to do both!

Of course. Why are you making this point?

DenBord:Other choices are not mutually exclusive. For example, you can choose to put money into the offering for local church budget, or you can put money in the offering for the upcoming evangelistic meetings. You can do one, or the other, or you can do both.

Either way, "you are free to do that which you choose to do".

In one case, the choices are mutually exclusive, and you are free to do that which you choose to do ... you can choose between the two mutually exclusive events.

In the other case, they are not mutually exclusive. But still, either way, you are free to do that which you choose to do.

In either case, these are two different types of choices, not two different definitions of free will. The first is an example of mutually exclusive activities. The other an example of two activities of which you can do one or the other, or you can do both.

Why are you making these points?


Tom:
Actually spilling water on your shirt isn't a good choice for an event, since that is likely something which happens accidentally, so does not involve free will, since you did not will for the water to fall on your shirt. So let's change this slightly to taking a drink of water, something you would choose consciously to do.

DenBord: OK.


Tom:
Ok, under the definition of free will that you are free to do that which you choose to do (compatibilistic), it doesn't matter if God (or anyone else) sees what you will do, since you are simply doing what you want to do regardless of whether it's seen or not.

However, under the incompatibilistic, or libertarian, definition, for you to have free will it must be possible for you to either choose to drink the water or not. If it can be seen that you definitely will drink the water (by God, or anyone else), then there is no possibility that you won't, so under the incompatibilistic definition you cannot be said to have free will.

DenBorg:In either "definition", it is possible for you to either drink or not drink. Contrary to your assertion above, simply because God knows beforehand what your decision will be, does not mean that God forced you to decide one way or the other.

This has never been claimed. No assertion has been made about God's forcing anything to happen.

DenBorg: Just because God sees the future perfectly for what it will be, does not mean that the future is predetermined by God.

Or course not. This has not been asserted.

DenBorg: You are simply taking many words to say the following:

Quote:
If God knows the future perfectly, then you have no free will, because His foreknowledge predetermines what will happen, and you have no choice in the matter.

I've never asserted this. What you have quoted is no logically valid.

DenBorg: Here is a quote from one of your previous posts:

Quote:
First, the future isn’t determined by God’s foreknowledge.

DenBorg: Correct! However, it must be determined for God to have a foreknowledge.

If God knows the future perfectly, and if it isn't our free will nor God's foreknowledge which determines/fixes the future, then what does fix it in this case?

Nothing fixes it. It's not fixed. It's open.

DenBorg: For you presuppose that if God knows the future perfectly, then we have no free will.

God's knowledge of the future is irrelevant to what I've been saying. You keep making this same assertion over and over, but what you are suggesting has never been argued, at least not by me.

DenBorg: Therefore, according to you, our free will cannot determine what the future will be like. But you have also previously said that God's foreknowledge, which requires the future to be fixed/predetermined, is not what fixes or predetermines the future. So what, exactly, according to your way of thinking, would have fixed the future?!

I have not previously said that God's foreknowledge requires the future to be fixed. Actually I think I know what you mean, but you're not being very precise in stating it. It would probably be a good idea to quote something directly, then comment on that, rather than repeatedly make assertions that I've said things I haven't said.

DenBorg: And considering the following two quotes of yours from a couple of previous posts:

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
This isn't quite accurate. God does not know *definitively* that portion of the future which is contingent on man's free choice.

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
Quote:
For example, when God said to Peter, "You will deny me three times," was that just a really good guess of what he thought Peter might do, or did He cause Peter to sin, or was it simply God knowing the facts so well that He could know for certain the effects of future causes on Peter, or something else?
Of course He didn't cause Peter to sin. Do you really think that was a possibility?
God knew Peter's character. That was the main thing. He also knew what was about to happen. Certain elements of what would happen would depend upon the free will choice of sentient beings, but it certainly would not have been difficult to know that Peter would deny Christ. Again, God knew his character.

The question posed to you about whether Peter denied the Lord because God made him do so or because of his free choice, was prompted by Thomas' comment that "In my view, exact prophecy is exact for the reason that God makes things happen.", and you seem to at least partly support that idea.

I agree ... simply knowing Peter's character as well as did God, that alone would tell you that Peter would deny his Lord. However, while his character would indicate that he would deny his Lord, it cannot indicate that he would do so exactly three times, and exactly at the time Jesus said it would happen (before the cock crowed that very night).

So you are left with either God does know the future with perfect clarity, or God took a very big chance on being wrong by making such an exacting, precise prophecy.

Even the Gospel writers don't agree as to the details of the story. Surely the important thing isn't how many times the cock would crow, but that Peter would deny Christ. How did Christ know Peter would deny Him? Because He knew his character.

DenBorg: Remember, Jesus did not say to Peter, "I know you so well, that I just know you will deny me." But rather, Jesus was very explicit and exact:

Say there are a trillion possible futures, as of the time Jesus was speaking to Peter. In all of those trillion futures, God saw that Peter would deny Christ before the cock crowed some number of times. There is no logical problem with God's being able to predict the future, and there being more than one possible future.

I've never argued that God cannot see the future perfectly, only that the future is not fixed, which is to say, there is no one future. There are many possible futures, which is exactly what God sees. He doesn't see the one future of what will happen, because there is no such thing.

Quote:
Jesus said to him, “Assuredly, I say to you that this night, before the rooster crows, you will deny Me three times.”
Matthew 26:34

Now, was this exact prophecy fulfilled because Peter had no choice because Jesus said that it will happen and therefore God made him deny Jesus three times, that very night, all before the cock crowed?

Or was it fulfilled because of the choices that Peter made, and God simply knew what his choice would be before Peter knew and He knew all of the explicit details because He knows the future with perfect clarity, but it still happened because Peter chose to do so? IOW, God knew it defintely, "assuredly", beforehand ... but this in no wise took away Peter's free will.

The prophesy was fulfilled because God knew Peter's character, and knew what he would do.